Baghdad Ablaze: How to Extinguish the Fires in Iraq
Publish Date: September 15, 2007
ISBN: 978-0979705106
FOREWORD
Following the liberation of Iraq in 2003, why are Iraqis still fighting? To extinguish the fires that burn in Iraq, one must discover why it is ablaze, what would move Iraqi politicians to put out the fires, and what would induce Iraq’s neighbors to quench the flames. Heat, fuel, and oxygen are necessary to cause fire. So, what are the causes of violence in Iraq? There are three.
First, the occupation of Iraq provided the initial spark and ongoing heat for the insurgencies. But occupation is not the main cause of continuing violence in Iraq. Occupation is a pretext for terrorist groups to build organizations, for sectarian groups to broaden their political base, and for Iran to seek control over Iraq politically, militarily, and economically.
Second, ethnic and religious strife, prior discrimination by Sunnis against Shiites, disputes over federalism, de-Baathification policies, differences over a proposed national oil law, and disputes about equitable distribution of oil and natural gas revenues contribute to Iraqi instability.
Third, Tehran’s subversive sponsorship of militias is like oxygen fanning the flames of conflict in Iraq. The Iranian regime provides training, weapons, and funding for primarily Shiite militias but also for other militias across the political spectrum, including al Qaeda. Instability allows Tehran to influence Iraqi factions in pursuit of its own ideological and national interests. The Iranian regime has also developed a comprehensive socio-economic network in Iraq based on its economic, financial, trade, and investment activities in the country to win Iraqi hearts and minds.
How to put out the fires? Extinguishing the fires ablaze in Baghdad requires a shift toward an unconventional war strategy that undermines militias and insurgent groups; engagement of moderate Iraqis who favor an independent, secular, and democratic Iraq with clear distance from Tehran via the offices of the Iranian opposition in Iraq—the Mujahedeen-e Khalq; and an international realignment that isolates Tehran and empowers the Iranian people for democratic change.
On the basis of research and analysis, the Iran Policy Committee recommends the following steps to extinguish the blaze in Iraq:
1. Isolate the Iranian regime diplomatically and economically.
2. Empower the Iranian people by delisting the Mujahedeen-e Khalq from the Foreign Terrorist Organizations list
3. Enlist the MEK to wean Sunnis from the insurgency and break the cycle of sectarian violence.
4. Take direct action against Iranian proxies in Iraq, including disarming the militias.
5. Constrain Iranian economic influence in Iraq.
6. Support Iraqi economic growth, diversification, and programs targeted to help vulnerable communities.
7. Offer economic incentives to militia members and ex-soldiers to demobilize, disarm, and reintegrate into Iraqi society.
Professor Raymond Tanter, President; General Thomas McInerney, Chairman, Advisory Council; General Edward Rowny; General Paul Vallely; Captain Chuck Nash; Colonel Bill Cowan; R. Bruce McColm; Neil Livingstone
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Occupation, Iraqi Politics, and the Economy
The invasion and occupation of Iraq provided the initial spark and ongoing heat for the insurgencies in two ways: first, through the placement of several hundred thousand foreign and mainly Western soldiers in a Muslim country; and second, by not providing sufficient troops to secure the country in the wake of political and security vacuums that ensued after the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime. Occupation became a pretext for terrorist groups and militias to build organizations, for sects to broaden their political base, and for Iran to exert its influence and control over Iraq.
There is a plethora of Iraqi political lists and parties, as well as ever-shifting alliances between and among them. Parties have been formed primarily along ethnic, religious, and/or sectarian lines, and ally themselves with various external actors accordingly to their respective persuasions.
The drastic turn toward sectarianism and attendant political violence played out over key issues like oil, federalism, and de-Baathification. The proposed national oil law has sparked strife among sectarian groups: Sunnis who live in resource-poor areas want centralized management and control over the distribution of oil revenues, while Kurds and many Shiites prefer greater regional governance.
Oil-rich Kirkuk has been another flashpoint, and is, in many ways, the nexus of conflict. The city represents a kind of microcosm of Iraq in which historical, sectarian, ethnic, and religious differences are played out against a backdrop of foreign interests and potential foreign political and military intervention.
The oil issue also cuts across the debate over federalism and the ability of provinces to join together to form a region. Federalism and oil intersect too in the differences in interpretation over who will manage and control oil revenues from future oil and natural gas discoveries.
De-Baathification has provoked sectarian tensions as well. Sunnis want to see the blanket de-Baathification policy enacted by the Coalition Provisional Authority reversed. Attempts to produce an acceptable amnesty law have proved largely unsuccessful because of Shiite grievances against prior Sunni abuses and fear that Sunnis will again control the government.
On the economic side, Iraq needs to undergo three major transitions: l) creating a productive, sustainable economy that will provide jobs; 2) moving from state-domination to a market economy; and 3) moving from oil dependence to economic diversification.
Widespread poverty, high unemployment and underemployment, as well as rising inflation are endemic and chronic. While the oil and natural gas resources hold enormous potential for economic gains for the country, the sector has been plagued by a number of daunting problems: a dilapidated energy infrastructure; sabotage and insurgent attacks on pipelines, refineries and installations; criminality; corruption; smuggling; high governmental fuel subsidies; and a general lack of transparency and accountability.
Insurgency, Sectarian Violence, and External Actors
While the invasion and occupation of Iraq sparked latent sectarian differences, the sponsorship of militias by external actors has acted as oxygen, fanning the flames of conflict in Iraq.
Numerous groups take part in the insurgency, which lacks centralized command and control. Some participate for short-term political gains, while others work for long-term Islamist ideals. Many are supported by external actors, primarily Iran, which has financed, trained, and equipped groups across the Iraqi political spectrum to fight coalition forces. These factions, parties, and sects participate in unconventional, asymmetric attacks against the occupation.
External actors have played a key role in fueling the insurgency. Regarding state connections with al Qaeda, attention has focused too much on the Iraq of Saddam Hussein and not enough on Iran. While there are many divisions between al Qaeda and its affiliates, a main source of abductions and arbitrary arrests by death squads, militias, and criminal gangs in Iraq lies with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, which oversees, supplies, and funds Iraqi militias. Indeed, under Khomeini’s rule, Iran created a special Qods Force (Jerusalem Force) to train and export terrorists. The Qods Force has been playing a destructive role in Iraq since 2003 by funding, training, and transferring weapons from Iran to several Iraqi militias, both Shiite and Sunni.
The Iranian regime is seeking the establishment of a direct land route between Iran and Syria as a means of conveying military equipment to terrorist elements in other countries. More ominously, Iran has supplied Iraqi insurgents with improvised explosive devices, explosively formed projectiles, and bomb technology.
On the political side, Tehran has manipulated Iraqi elections. It also has seven Arabic language television stations broadcasting in Iraq, which it uses as a means of delivering a pro-Tehran message.
The Iranian regime’s motivations to support Iraqi insurgents have been to spread the Iranian Revolution through a Shiite crescent of like-minded ideological allies and to project Iranian national interests. In pursuit of its interests, Tehran has adopted an ecumenical approach, cutting across sectarian fault lines—even cultivating al Qaeda and Sunni militias when advantageous to its own interests.
The Iranian regime has expanded its political influence by funding religious education, institutions, and mosques, particularly in the Shiite-dominated south. In addition, the regime has provided medical, charitable, and social welfare assistance to garner the sympathy and support of the local Shiite population.
Iranian economic interests and influence in Iraq have not received much attention from the international community. The Iranian regime has been increasingly active in Iraq, setting up 5 Iranian banks, including a branch of the Iranian National Bank in Baghdad. Tehran has committed to creating a $1 billion credit facility for Iranian investment in Iraq. In addition, Tehran has built up extensive trade links; forged bilateral national, provincial, local trade, and commercial agreements; set up industrial parks and border market centers; fostered religious-based tourism to Shiite sites; participated in international trade fairs; as well as promoted Iranian private sector investment in strategic Iraqi infrastructure, including rail, highway, and airport construction. Iranian economic interests in Iraq include the exploitation of Iraq’s oil and natural gas sector. In this context, Iran is building pipelines, supplying electricity through new Iranian-Iraqi electricity grid linkages, and providing refined oil products to Iraq.
The Iranian regime plays a key role in Iraq’s economy, which can also have profound political implications. In short, Iranian economic penetration of Iraq helps to project and strengthen Tehran’s political influence over the country.
Counterinsurgency, Interest-Based Politics, and Realignment
To promote peace and stability in Iraq, the country must transition from sectarian violence to interest-based politics, which can be cultivated through the development of civil society and an attendant civic culture.
A political system based more on sectarian and ethnic affinity than on secular interests makes it difficult to settle differences. Politics based on interests allows for deals to be cut across sectarian and ethnic lines. If the coalition forces can provide security, interest-based politics can flourish, as moderate groups forge common economic and political bonds.
In searching for a negotiated settlement to the conflicts that rage in Iraq, it is necessary to engage a third-party interlocutor to reach a Pareto Optimal solution between warring sides—one that is better to one and acceptable to another. Such an interlocutor exists in the form of the Mujahedeen-e Khalq, the principle Iranian opposition group that is based in Iraq. Because the MEK is trusted by Sunnis, moderate Shiites, and the American military, this organization can facilitate progress toward a national compact in Iraq.
With respect to the coalition forces side of the equation, there is a need for a counterinsurgency strategy that takes into account the unconventional tactics and strategies employed by insurgent groups. To counter the asymmetrical fighting style of insurgents, the American-led coalition forces have begun to shift to an unconventional war footing through the use special operations and intelligence-based forces. The explicit linkage between the 2007 military surge and political benchmarks is essential. In addition, more could be done in the area of disarming the militias—particularly the Iranian-backed Shiite proxy militias and the Mahdi Army—to pressure the Iranian regime to stop fueling violence in Iraq.
Realigning Iraqi politics can help quell the flames as well. Iraqi politicians need incentives to transition from sectarian- and ethnic-based strife to interest-based politics. Iran’s domination of Iraq’s political process has led to a backlash, which can work to the benefit and ascendance of more moderate forces in Iraq.
The Mujahedeen-e Khalq could be the link between the United States and Iraqi moderates. It could also help to isolate Iran further and send a political message to the regime’s leadership.
Because of the interference of Tehran, the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government is unwilling to address the primary political and economic grievances of moderate Sunni and Shiite groups. In this context, the MEK in Iraq, which has political support and good relations with Iraqis of diverse backgrounds and persuasions, offers a unique platform from which American diplomats might facilitate a national dialogue among moderate Iraqi Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. The MEK could also be helpful to coalition forces in providing intelligence for border control operations, as well as on the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps infiltration into Iraq.
Another important dimension of extinguishing the fires in Iraq is the need to forge an American-backed international realignment involving Israel and Sunni states, such as Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, all of which fear the growing influence of Iran in Iraq and in the region as a whole.
IPC Plan to Extinguish the Fires that Burn in Baghdad
The Iran Policy Committee advocates the following seven-point plan to stabilize Iraq.
1. Isolate the Iranian regime diplomatically and economically. Neither containment nor engagement of/with Iran is the answer. It is essential for the international community to recognize the profound extent to which Iran is adversely impacting the political, economic, and military situation in Iraq to further Tehran’s own ideological goals and national interests.
2. Empower the Iranian people by delisting the Mujahedeen-e Khalq from the Foreign Terrorist Organizations list. The MEK in Iraq, which has political support and good relations with Iraqis of diverse backgrounds and persuasions, offers a unique platform from which American diplomats might facilitate a national dialogue among moderate Iraqi Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds.
3. Enlist the MEK to wean Sunnis from the insurgency and also break the cycle of sectarian violence. The American-led coalition should engage with the MEK and use its services as a trusted interlocutor to forge a political consensus among moderate Iraqi groups. The MEK in Iraq should facilitate a political settlement among the factions to deny the fuel of political violence.
4. Take direct action against Iranian proxies in Iraq, including disarming the militias.
5. Constrain Iranian economic influence in Iraq. With respect to isolating Iran and diminishing Tehran’s influence in Iraq, the international community in general and the coalition in particular should examine ways of integrating Iraq more fully into the global economy.
6. Support Iraqi economic growth, diversification, and programs targeted to help vulnerable communities.
7. Offer economic incentives to militia members and ex-soldiers to demobilize, disarm, and reintegrate into Iraqi society.
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Please refer to the IPC Event page "Baghdad Ablaze - Book Rollout" to download a pdf file of the Press Release, the Executive Summary and a flyer for distribution.
Autographed Copies of Baghdad Ablaze are Available!
Major General Paul E. Vallely, US Army (ret.), host of Osprey Media's Internet Radio show Stand Up America and co-author of the Iran Policy Committee's latest publication Baghdad Ablaze, has autographed copies available for sale on his website www.standupamericaradio.com. Copies can also be requested via email addressed to Paul Vallely at standupamerica1@gmail.com.