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Public Data to Complement Classified Intelligence—
Assessing the Credibility of Sources about Alleged
Terrorist Activities of the
Mujahedeen-e-Khalq (MEK)/People’s Mojahedin
Organization of Iran (PMOI)

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Executive Summary

This study addresses credibility of sources and allegations regarding the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq (MEK/PMOI) on the Foreign Terrorist Organizations list of the State Department. The author derives credibility standards from interviews of former intelligence officials, a review of intelligence literature, and his own government experience.

A goal is to assess the credibility of allegations against the MEK. The paper compares accusations of terrorism against the MEK with media reports and public terrorism databases, finding no evidence to substantiate Iranian regime allegations that the MEK perpetrated terrorist incidents in two cities in Iraq: Karbala and Samarra.

To evaluate credibility of allegations against the MEK, the study uses: Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS); Global Database on Terrorism (GTD); and RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI). Neither GTD nor RDWTI lists the MEK as a perpetrator of any terrorist incidents after 2001. In almost seven years, the WITS lists only four allegations that mention the MEK in 2005; other organizations claimed responsibility for three of the incidents, and in none is the MEK accused directly. The MEK is only “suspected” or “blamed” by unknown sources along with several other groups in the incident description. Also, during this time, MEK members were in Camp Ashraf monitored by U.S. military seven days a week, 24 hours a day. Language used in the descriptions and lack of direct allegations about the MEK raise credibility doubts about these claims.

The study analyzes State Department Administrative Records for its designation of the MEK and the Department’s *Country Reports on Terrorism*. There are serious questions about source credibility and inconsistency in language in these documents, particularly about MEK capability and intent. When the MEK is alleged to have been involved in terrorism, it had surrendered its weapons to U.S. military forces in Iraq, was under their control, and its members had renounced violence; hence, it is highly unlikely the MEK had capability and intent to commit terrorism.

The study examines Tehran’s allegations against the MEK: These claims lack credibility because the research did not find publicly available evidence to substantiate them. The research uses unauthorized released intelligence from WikiLeaks to complement public databases. The WikiLeaks reports highlight efforts of Tehran to foster violence in Iraq, perpetrate attacks against U.S. and Iraqi troops, and do not mention the MEK in such violence.

The study makes inferences about the credibility of classified intelligence in comparison to open source reporting, focusing specifically on likely presence of bias, deception, and predispositions. The research finds overreliance on classified material is suboptimal, suggesting classified material be reinforced by publicly available information. In cases where unclassified information does not support inferences drawn from classified material, e.g., publicly available information does not support the conclusion that the MEK engages in terrorism or terrorist activities, the credibility of such conjectures diminishes. There are three conclusions about the MEK:

1. The disappearance of the 2006 accusation of MEK “capacity and will” to commit terrorism or terrorist activities from *Country Reports on Terrorism* 2007, 2008, and 2009 suggests uncertainty in the State Department about MEK capacity and will to conduct terrorism or terrorist activities.
2. In three major public databases on terrorism, there are no confirmed and credible reports labeling the MEK as a perpetrator of any terrorist incident after 2001.
3. Despite Iranian regime allegations that the MEK has committed terrorism in Iran since 2001, these accusations lack credibility because of the biased nature of the source, and the study does not find evidence in public databases or media sources to corroborate them.

Introduction

The IPC is regularly asked by Members of the U.S. Congress and their staff about Iran and the role of the Iranian opposition. There have been many discussions on Iran in the House of Representatives, which also focused on the listing of the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq, also known as the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK/PMOI) on the Foreign Terrorist Organizations ([FTO](#)) list maintained by the Department of State.¹

At the invitation of Congressional staff, the IPC conducted several briefings on Iran in general and on Iranian opposition organizations in particular. The main question that was repeatedly posed to the IPC during these briefings concerned the credibility of accusations against the MEK.

The credibility issue gained prominence when a July 2010 court ruling [ordered](#) the State Department to reevaluate its FTO designation of the MEK.²

State made its designation based on a 2009 Administrative Record that had both classified and unclassified portions. The classified information was only available *in Camera* ("privately") to the Court. At Oral Argument, the Government's attorney took the position that "The overwhelming material here remains classified." That, he argued, formed essentially the basis of the Secretary's decision to deny the revocation petition of the MEK's designation. For its part, the Court noted that "none of the AEDPA [[Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act](#)] cases decides whether an administrative decision relying critically on undisclosed classified material would comport with due process because in none was the classified record essential to uphold an FTO designation."

Such "critical" reliance, about which the Court cautioned, also raises serious academic questions, which this study addresses:

- What is the optimal proportion of classified and unclassified information?
- Does classified data have enhanced credibility if supported by publicly available information?
- If unclassified information does not support classified material, how credible would it be?

To anticipate the main conclusions, the study suggests that overreliance on classified "material" is suboptimal; classified material should be reinforced by publicly available information; and if unclassified information does not support classified material, its credibility diminishes.

This academic research not only provides an objective response to Congressional inquiries about the credibility of sources used to justify the designation of the MEK; the study might also serve as input to a review of the MEK terrorist designation by the State Department.

¹ <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm>

² <http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/201007/09-1059-1255582.pdf>

Consistent with its mission to create and disseminate knowledge about threats from the Iranian regime and an enhanced role for Iranian pro-democracy organizations in addressing such dangers, the Iran Policy Committee (IPC) compiled a comprehensive list of allegations against the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq and evaluated the credibility of such claims against the group.

Using publicly accessible electronic and non-electronic sources, the IPC compared accusations against the MEK with the public record. A goal is to improve the mix of private and public information in making terrorist designation decisions.³ Quality of information is more important than quantity, and the aim is to provide quality public information to help the terrorist designation decision making process.

By relying too much on classified information about the MEK and not enough on open source reporting, the State Department may have increased the possibility that biased information guided the decision making process. While it is reasonable to rely on classified material for designation, it is also logical to expect public information to support the classified information. There must be some proportionality between unclassified and classified material. In other words, the unclassified information must not contradict the classified record.

By using unclassified information as a complement to classified reporting, the State Department and Intelligence Community would be in a better position to correct preconceptions operating due to Iran's use of disinformation against opponents like the MEK.

Court Opinion Highlights Significance of Source Credibility

In its July 2010 ruling about the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran's appeal of its continued designation in January 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit found fault with the decision making process of the Secretary of State. After reviewing the 2009 Administrative Record consisting of both classified and unclassified information, the Secretary denied an MEK petition to revoke its designation and published the decision in the *Federal Register* on 12 January 2009. [See 74 Fed.Reg. at 1273-74](#)

The Secretary [held](#) that ⁴

“In considering the evidence as a whole, the MEK [PMOI] has not shown that the relevant circumstances are sufficiently different from the circumstances that were the basis for the 2003

³ At Oral Argument in January 2010, the U.S. Government admitted that the “overwhelming” amount of material in the Administrative Record on which the Secretary of State made her designation decision about the Mujahedeen-e Khalq in January 2009 remains classified. And the U.S. Government argued, “It was the classified material that ... [was] key.” See Oral Argument of Petitioners on behalf of the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT, PEOPLE'S MOJAHEDIN ORGANIZATION OF IRAN, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, et al., Respondents, No. 09-1059, Tuesday, 12 January 2010, Washington, DC.

<http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/201007/09-1059-1255582.pdf>

⁴ <http://chesney.jnspl.com/2010/07/20/nationalsecuritylaw-peoples-mojahedin-org-of-iran-v-u-s-department-of-state-d-c-cir-july-16-2010/>

re-designation,” and that “[a]s a consequence, the MEK continues to be a foreign organization that engages in terrorist activity...or terrorism ...or retains the capability and intent to” do so. *Id.*; see [74 Fed.Reg. at 1273-74](#)

The Court [questioned](#) both the credibility and sources of evidence used by the Secretary in her January 2009 decision to maintain the designation of the MEK.⁵

The Court [asked](#) about criteria the Secretary used to make her decision:

...the Secretary cited a source that it seemed to regard as credible but did not indicate to what part of the statute the source’s information was relevant... While we will not substitute our judgement [sic] for that of the Secretary in deciding which sources are credible, we must determine whether the record before her provides “a sufficient basis for a reasonable person to conclude” that the statutory requirements have been met.

First...the Secretary should indicate in her administrative summary which sources she regards as sufficiently credible that she relies on them; and she should explain to which part of...[statute governing designation]...the information she relies on relates. Second, although the Secretary must give the PMOI an opportunity to rebut the unclassified material on which she relies, [footnote omitted] AEDPA [[Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act](#)] does not allow access to the classified record as it makes clear that classified material “shall not be subject to disclosure for such time as it remains classified, except that such information may be disclosed to a court ex parte and in camera for purposes of judicial review.”

We...remand with instructions to the Secretary to provide the PMOI the opportunity to review and rebut the unclassified portions of the record on which she relied.⁶

The Court stated that the PMOI should have the opportunity to review and rebut only unclassified parts of the Administrative Record on which the Secretary relied to make her designation decision. However, one might expect the Court to require criteria of credibility and plausibility to apply also to classified information regarding the decision to designate.⁷

Research Design Using Public Databases, Media Reports, and Leaked Intelligence

The research design for this study combines interviews of American intelligence officials, Iranian opposition figures, and officials representing public databases on terrorism. In addition, the design incorporates searches of publicly accessible databases, media reports, and leaked intelligence. A goal is to clarify, supplement, and evaluate the credibility of allegations of MEK terrorist activity since 2003.

⁵ <http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/201007/09-1059-1255582.pdf>

⁶ <http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/201007/09-1059-1255582.pdf>

⁷ See Oral Argument before the Court on 12 January 2010: Senior Circuit Judge Stephen Williams asked the Government, “In looking at the classified material are we to be indifferent to matters of plausibility, [and] are we to be indifferent to matters of the Secretary’s apparent commitment to any particular sources?” Asking such a question may imply judicial concern that credibility and plausibility standards apply to classified intelligence.

The primary time period for the investigation is between 2003, when the latest designation cycle began, on one hand, and 2009, when the Secretary of State declined to grant a petition for revocation submitted by the MEK.

This research also includes allegations of incidents two years before and two years after that time interval. The objective is to cover all developments until the present time and consider even a longer period (two years in advance of the beginning of legal criteria) to see if there are any indications of a change in circumstances that could have been detected even before 2003.

Below are the specific steps in the conduct of this inquiry on how public databases and media reports can complement classified intelligence in evaluating and enhancing the credibility of each.

1. Determine how members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) or other relevant agencies evaluate credibility of claims in general and terrorist accusations in particular.
2. Apply criteria for assessing credibility of sources most likely to make allegations about the MEK, i.e., Iranian intelligence agencies.
3. Without access to classified sources used by the State Department in designating the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq as a terrorist organization, this study uses public databases and media at the time of alleged incidents to infer the validity of the designation, i.e., whether it is reasonable in view of confirming evidence in the public domain.
4. Search qualitative media reports and quantitative terrorism databases to see whether any of them attribute any “act of terrorism” to the MEK from 2003, when the present designation cycle began, to October 2010; and present such incidents in spreadsheet form for ease of use by the community of scholars, the Department of State, as well as the Intelligence Community.
5. Examine redacted Administrative Records compiled by the Department of State relevant to designations in 2003 and 2009 to determine whether there are sources in those records that might be assessed for their credibility.
6. Compare the Department of State *Country Reports on Terrorism* (CRT) 2009, which provides a list of alleged terrorist activities for the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq, with the redacted Administrative Records and public information. The 2009 Administrative Record as a whole was the basis the Secretary used in her January 2009 designation decision; alleged activities of the MEK in CRT 2009 may provide a hint of the type of unclassified documentary basis for the Secretary’s [January 2009 designation decision](#).⁸ In CRT 2009 and in the redacted Administrative Records,

⁸ <http://chesney.jnslp.com/2010/07/20/nationalsecuritylaw-peoples-mojahedin-org-of-iran-v-u-s-department-of-state-d-c-cir-july-16-2010/>

there are no references to any terrorist acts by the MEK since 2003; contentions at other times, moreover, have no statutory relevance to the designation.

7. Compare a sample of Iranian regime allegations that the MEK maintains a capability and intent to commit terrorism or terrorist activities against independent sources to evaluate the credibility of Tehran's charges.
8. Assess unauthorized leaked intelligence relating to the role of the Iranian regime and its proxies in Iraq to evaluate the credibility of regime accusations.

Author's Background and Experience to Assess Credibility

As a former member of the National Security Council staff in the Reagan-Bush White House, the author was a consumer of intelligence on behalf of the President; hence, the author has the background and experience to assess the credibility of allegations based on highly classified information.

And as a member of the academic community who wrote his doctoral thesis on conflict behavior including terrorist incidents, the writer has the scholarly background to evaluate the credibility of unclassified sources.

The author, moreover, established the [International Relations Archive](#) of the Inter-University Consortium of Political and Social Research (ICPSR).⁹ It is an international consortium of about 700 academic institutions and research organizations; ICPSR maintains a data archive of more than 500,000 quantitative files, and it provides training in data access and methods of analysis for the social science and history research community.

With White House experience, scholarly background, and archival understanding, the writer is well-positioned to conduct a study of the credibility of accusations about a group on the State Department Foreign Terrorist Organizations list.

Credibility Standards

Interviews of Former Intelligence Officials

In an email interview with a former National Intelligence Officer (NIO) on 1 October 2010, the author posed the following questions:

With your experience in the intelligence community, perhaps you would be willing to advise me about general criteria for assessing reliability and/or credibility of sources and allegations.

⁹ <http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies?q=international+relations&geography=Global&paging.startRow=1>

Are there articles or books to find definitions of such terms for intelligence analysts?

Do you know of particular rules of thumb about reliability and/or credibility?

How would you define and assess reliability and/or credibility of sources and indications?

The former NIO replied:

Reliability refers to the track record, if any, of a reporting source: how much of what the same source has reported in the past has turned out to be true? Credibility refers to an overall assessment of the likelihood that what is being reported or alleged now is true.

Reliability of the source is one ingredient in this assessment, but only one. Other ingredients include consistency with other streams of reporting, internal consistency of the report, and plausibility given the nature of what is being said.

While he stated that there are no rules of thumb regarding assessing credibility, he said there is literature on intelligence analysis that might give the author some ideas. See [Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis](#) by Richards Heuer and Randolph Pherson.¹⁰

Another high level member of the Community expressed similar views, but suggested that unclassified material could also be subject to manipulation. When the second former intelligence official discovered that this study sought to make an inference from lack of evidence confirming allegations that the MEK conducted terrorist incidents, she cautioned about a tendency in the Community to opine that “Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.”

However, as philosopher of science Irving Copi reasoned, it can be assumed that if a certain event had occurred, evidence of it could be discovered. Thus, Copi suggests absence of evidence can be reasonably viewed as positive proof of non-occurrence.¹¹ Correspondingly, “absence of evidence” of terrorist and/or violent incidents alleged to have been perpetrated by an organization over almost a decade strongly implies that it is not engaged in terrorism.

After consulting other members of the Intelligence Community, the author determined there was sufficient convergence with the statements of the two former high level officials to use their views as representative of the Community for the conduct of this inquiry.

Credibility of Classified and Open Source Reporting

Webster’s online dictionary [defines](#) credibility as capacity or power of inspiring belief.¹² In this regard, policymakers often [attribute](#) greater credibility to classified information; but an intelligence analyst

¹⁰ http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=ntt_athr_dp_sr_2?_encoding=UTF8&sort=relevancerank&search-alias=books&field-author=Randolph%20H.%20Pherson

¹¹ Irving Copi. *Introduction to Logic*. Prentice Hall, NJ: 2008.

conducted a systematic survey of his colleagues and concluded that they see only a small difference in the credibility of open sources and classified sources.¹³

Indeed, unclassified information is accepted in the Community as a necessary element of all-source intelligence reporting, as demonstrated by the March 1994 memorandum entitled *Director of Central Intelligence Directive 2/12*, which established the Community Open Source Program Office.¹⁴

The Community seeks to assess the credibility of human sources. Former Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) General James Clapper, who became Director of National Intelligence as of 2010, made the Pentagon a leading department in establishing source credibility.¹⁵ Prior to General Clapper becoming Director of National Intelligence, the author had the privilege of meeting with him at the Pentagon and then to have productive follow-up sessions with his staff regarding credibility of sources.

Moreover, analysts in the Community recognize the credibility of any given National Intelligence Estimate depended less on the quality of the analysis it contained than upon the general credibility of the institution that produced it.¹⁶ Such recognition places the focus on the nature of sources, where it rightfully belongs. If sources of assertions are not provided, there is an inability to conduct independent confirmation and to detect biases that distort an Estimate.

Having performed systematic searches of three massive electronic databases and any number of media sources to verify allegations about terrorist incidents purportedly committed by the MEK, this study concluded the following:

- For the most part, the track record of the main source of allegations about the MEK, the Iranian regime, is poor.
- There is lack of consistency between the designation of the MEK as a FTO and open source material, an inconsistency that challenges the validity of the listing.
- Because MEK members in Iraq were under U.S. military monitoring and protection between 2003 and 2009, the plausibility of the MEK engaging in terrorist incidents or having capability to commit terrorism is close to zero.

¹² <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/credibility>

¹³ Dax R. Norman, National Security Agency, *How to Identify credible sources on the Web*, unclassified thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Military Intelligence College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence, 19 December 2001; see survey questions 7a through 7s and Table 8, the latter of which compares classified and unclassified source credibility.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Department of Defense [INSTRUCTION NUMBER 5210.91, August 12, 2010](#) USD(I)

¹⁶ <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/sherman-kent-and-the-board-of-national-estimates-collected-essays/intro.html>

Bias, the Enemy of Credibility

The State Department in its analysis of the information contained in the Administrative Records might wish to consider that classified reports could be subject to manipulation. In this connection, a major enemy of credibility is bias. Fortunately, psychologists have developed techniques to help handle bias. One way is to recognize how the mind strains for consistency and to manage that tendency. Intelligence analysts can be misled by a predisposition to be more comfortable with indications and warnings that are consistent than with inconsistent information.¹⁷ For example, if an organization has been repeatedly designated as an FTO for several years, one is predisposed to interpret new data in light of a continuous history of designation even if new information contradicts prior beliefs.

Conclusions drawn from a small body of consistent data engender more unwarranted confidence and hence may be less credible than inferences derived from a larger body of less consistent data. Increasing the ability to manage inconsistent information is one way to enhance the credibility of an estimate. If a greater proportion of unclassified to secret information produces inconsistent information and inclines analysts to downplay the public in favor of private sources, analysts must be aware of this tendency. Being forewarned is to be forearmed.

A concern here is that classified material may be biased in one steady direction because of the huge effort of the Iranian regime to target western intelligence services. Interviews the author conducted in Iraq found that Tehran often communicates false “secrets” about the MEK in the hope and expectation they would be intercepted by U.S. signal intelligence (SIGNIT electronic intercepts) and perceived as credible. Presuming coded messages from the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) to the Iranian Embassy Baghdad would be intercepted by U.S. intelligence services, Tehran has been said to plant false information about the MEK in such channels to deceive American analysts.

According to the sources familiar with the Iranian intelligence network and its *modus operandi* in Iraq, Tehran also uses its proxies in that country—many of whom work in the security and intelligence apparatus of Iraq—in a systematic manner to channel disinformation about the MEK to American intelligence. Therefore, it would be in the interest of the State Department and the American Intelligence Community to take seriously the strong likelihood that Iran is indirectly feeding information via the intelligence apparatus of a state considered to be a friend of the USA, i.e., Iraq.

Indeed, the author’s interviews in Iraq during October 2008 demonstrate how the Iranian regime uses various channels to disseminate its disinformation to create an artificial “consistency” for intelligence analysts. It used this technique in the run-up to the war in Iraq, when it is widely believed in Iraq that Tehran was a major source of such disinformation. Furthermore, Tehran was successful creating the perception before the Iraq War that the MEK would fight the Coalition to the bitter end. Consider the contradiction between the amicable and cooperative attitude of MEK members when American forces

¹⁷ Since 1975 in courses at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, University of Michigan, and Georgetown University, the author has been teaching students about prospect theory. It addresses, *inter alia*, cognitive biases that interfere with estimating the likelihood of future events. This section also draws on applications of cognitive psychology for minimizing bias in the practice of intelligence. See Richards Heuer, [*Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*](#): Washington DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency, 1999; Richards Heuer and Randolph Pherson, [*Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis*](#): Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2010.

encountered them with the image Americans had from intelligence briefings prior to the start of the war, to wit, the MEK would be a hostile force like that of [al Qaeda of Iraq](#),¹⁸ [Ansar al Islam](#),¹⁹ and [Jaish al-Mahdi](#).²⁰

Tehran was equally successful in propagating the fanciful notion that Iraq's supposed weapons of mass destruction were [hidden](#) in Camp Ashraf, which houses MEK members in Iraq.²¹ On 12 November 2002, in a three-page spread, including sketches of diagrams of alleged locations, a Canadian newspaper, *The Ottawa Citizen*, accused the MEK of concealing Iraq's presumed weapons of mass destruction (WMD). But none of the official bodies authorized by Washington to search for WMDs Saddam Hussein supposedly hid in Iraq made any charges about such weapons being housed in the MEK base; hence, there has been no substantiation of this allegation.

There is precedent for the Iranian regime to penetrate western intelligence services with the aim to disseminate false information about the MEK. Between April and July 2010, the German news magazine *Focus* ran stories that Tehran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) had infiltrated Germany's Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) for almost a decade.²²

At first, the BfV considered the intelligence to be credible indications the MEK had both capability and intention to launch terrorist attacks in Germany. BfV analysts in Berlin were predisposed to believe the information given to them by the MOIS agent. Upon conducting a thorough counterintelligence investigation, however, the BfV concluded that such intelligence was politically motivated propaganda to discredit the MEK.

Subsequently, the BfV removed from its public websites harsh references about the MEK based on this discredited Iranian source and officially omitted the MEK from the list of organizations that use violence or have the capability and intent to do so. The 2008 Annual Report, the most recent website of the BfV published 19 May 2009, [states](#), "Adherents of the People's Mojahedin Organisation of Iran (MEK) and its political wing National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) that is acting in Europe continue to use intensive propaganda in order to achieve their organisation's deletion from the European Union list of terrorist organisations."²³ Ultimately, the Court of First Instance of the European Communities (CFI) [issued](#) a judgment annulling the MEK's designation.²⁴ Subsequently, on 26 January 2009, the EU [decided](#) not to renew the terrorist listing of the MEK.²⁵

¹⁸ <http://www.cfr.org/publication/14811/profile.html>

¹⁹ http://www.cfr.org/publication/9237/ansar_alislam_iraq_islamistkurdish_separatists_ansar_alsunnah.html#p5

²⁰ http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/06/sadrs_special_groups.php

²¹ <http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmfaaff/142/142we20.htm>

²² http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/deutschland-potsdamer-poker-um-katanga_aid_534177.html

²³ http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Broschueren/2009/vsb_2008_en.pdf?__blob=publicationFile

²⁴ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62008A0284:EN:HTML>

²⁵ <http://www.allbusiness.com/government/government-bodies-offices-government/11761697-1.html>

The disposition of intelligence analysts and policy makers to favor “old” narratives about the MEK is a window of opportunity for Tehran’s intelligence agencies to penetrate their western counterparts but also to flood the regime’s media outlets with a “consistent” stream of allegations about the MEK.

Consider the psychological predisposition of [anchoring](#).²⁶ It explains why the Community may be more receptive to a consistent narrative than coders of public databases, who may be less aware of the FTO status of the MEK.

Even though intelligence analysts are trained to discount evidence from a biased source like the Iranian regime, consistent allegations about the MEK even from such a source may reinforce the prior belief and make the Community receptive to additional information consistent with its preconception about the MEK. As stated above, it is also important to note that the Iranian regime uses proxies to conceal the origin and the source of the information. Therefore, unsuspecting intelligence analysts would not be aware that they are being fed by Iranian sources.

Deception Detection

To guard against bias that may result from overreliance on classified intelligence, one can use a “[quality of information check](#).”²⁷ This technique verifies and evaluates completeness and soundness of sources, helps detect possible deception strategies by an adversary, and identifies key information gaps for intelligence collectors.

Assessing credibility of sources is a key feature of the intelligence estimation process. Establishing how much confidence to place in a source should come from an assessment of the credibility and reliability of that source. Multiple streams of converging classified and unclassified evidence may be a way to avoid the bias of overreliance on too few sources. Without understanding the motivation of the source providing information, it is difficult to assess its credibility and establish a confidence level.

The Iranian regime is motivated to slander its main opposition and does so effectively by an adroit use of the media. Thus, any charges against the MEK emanating from state-controlled Iranian media should be considered suspect and used only in conjunction with independent sources. The use of open source electronic databases provides an objective baseline against which to measure classified intelligence procured via secret means; doing so should also enhance the credibility of analytic judgments.

Cognitive Predispositions that Bias Intelligence Estimation

In addition to the strain toward consistency with inertia, another bias that lowers the credibility of estimates is called “[availability](#).”²⁸

²⁶ <http://heuristics.behaviouralfinance.net/anchoring/>

²⁷ <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/psychology-of-intelligence-analysis/PsychofIntelNew.pdf>

²⁸ <http://www.ewol.net.cn/SiteData/HtmlEditor/201042411332404.pdf>

Estimates are influenced by how easily one can recall similar instances, i.e., those that are readily available. Because the Iranian regime has swamped western intelligence services and media with false narratives about its main opposition, there is a greater tendency to imagine recalling a similar instance in the past, which leaves the analyst receptive to frequent reiterations of the negative allegations by Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security concerning the MEK.

Overconfidence is another bias operating against the process of making valid estimates.²⁹

In translating uncertainty into likelihoods, expert intelligence analysts may be overconfident, especially because they are readily able to recall Tehran-inspired prior instances in which the MEK is supposedly guilty of some previous egregious behavior.

To hypothesize that the U.S. Intelligence Community may have been deceived by the Iranian regime's disinformation campaign against its main opposition is very serious, especially because the Community has training programs aimed to prevent such manipulation. It would be far better to gain direct access to the classified information on which the Secretary relied to designate the MEK to validate the hypothesis about the Community being misled.

Not being able to test this "hypothesis" makes it more like an assumption. Without such access, the next best option is to use the Court ordered instruction for the Secretary to provide the PMOI opportunity to review and rebut unclassified portions of the record on which she relied. Such an order provides a window of opportunity for a scholarly and policy conversation of the relevance of publicly available terrorist incidents in the event those with access to the classified record would wish it as a complement to classified material.

Search of Qualitative Media Reports and Electronic Terrorism Databases

Another assumption in this study is that terrorist incidents are generally too public not to appear in the archives of databases or reported in mainstream newspapers of record. While terrorist intention may be under the radar screen of data collectors, it is more difficult to hide capability and incidents; hence, systematic searches of qualitative media reports should reveal evidence of capability; likewise, searches of terrorist databases should uncover incidents. Absent convergence of classified and unclassified information on visible terrorist incidents suggests the private record may be problematic at best.

One terror allegation stands out among others because the Federal Appeals Court gave the charge widespread prominence in its July 2010 ruling. The charge is an alleged scheme by the MEK to slip a group of females from Camp Ashraf into Karbala, Iraq; they supposedly were trained at Camp Ashraf for suicide bombing missions against Iraqis.

The second involves accusations that MEK members had targeted Shiite holy sites in Samarra, Iraq, on which the Court does not focus but the classified intelligence may include.

²⁹ <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/psychology-of-intelligence-analysis/PsychofIntelNew.pdf>

Competing Narratives: Iranian Regime as Source of Allegations against the MEK for Terrorism in Karbala and Tehran's Complicity in Targeting the Green Zone in Baghdad

Karbala is a holy site for Shiite Muslims—the location of the Golden-domed mosque; Karbala has been targeted in a series of suicide attacks and other bombings at least during [2003](#), [2004](#), [2007](#), and [2010](#), among other years. It is noteworthy that in none of the public reporting at the time of these bombings could IPC researchers find any mention of the MEK as perpetrator of the attacks or being involved in a conspiracy related to Karbala.

At the time of publication of this study, another bombing in Karbala occurred on 8 November 2010. Reuters [reported](#) that a car bomb aimed at Iranian pilgrims killed seven and wounded 34 at the entrance of Karbala, and that “The [Iranian] pilgrims are often targeted by Sunni Islamist groups like al Qaeda in Iraq, which view Shi’ite Muslims as apostates.”³⁰

Due to the sensitivity of Karbala in Shiite-Sunni relations, allegations that the MEK plotted to bomb or in fact carried out an attack in this holy city are bound to be newsworthy events whenever the claims are made and irrespective of the claimant. Thus, it is no surprise the Iranian regime tags its main opposition with seeking to bomb holy sites in Karbala. But researchers were unable to verify Tehran’s allegations using independent media sources and databases.

What is surprising is how such an unsubstantiated accusation about Karbala could clear what should be a very high threshold to enter the U.S. Intelligence Community and become classified information. The absolute necessity for independent confirmation of intelligence that originates with Tehran and alleges its main opposition is involved in a bombing plot in Iraq while under U.S. protection there would seem to be a no-brainer.

At Oral Argument on 12 January 2010 before the Federal Appeals Court, there was a discussion between Judge Tatel and the Justice Department representative for the U.S. Government. At issue was whether the Secretary used evidence of possible MEK plans to attack the international (Green) zone in Baghdad and Karbala in reaching her decision to designate. After some prompting, the Government stated that the Secretary had not relied much on that evidence.

Nevertheless, in the Court’s ruling on 16 July 2010, it [stated](#)

Some of the reports included in the Secretary’s analysis on their face express reservations about the accuracy of the information contained therein. See, e.g., Suppl. Admin. R., MEK-11 (describing “possible plans to attack [the] international zone in Baghdad” but conceding that “the ultimate sources of the information...[were] unknown and as such, their access, veracity, and motivations were unknown”).³¹

³⁰ http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2010/11/08/world/international-uk-iraq-violence-pilgrims.html?_r=1&ref=global-home&pagewanted=print

³¹ <http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/201007/09-1059-1255582.pdf>

Irrespective of how much the Secretary actually relied on such evidence, it was a part of the classified administrative record against the MEK but now is declassified. The irony of the situation is that while charges against the MEK relating to potential Green Zone plots are unsubstantiated by the public record, evidence taken from previously classified documents suggests that Iran itself plotted attacks against the Green Zone.

The [WikiLeaks](#) Iraq War files contain a vast array of formerly classified military intelligence reports; they show Iran conspired to have its Iraqi proxies attack the Green Zone.³²

The Guardian newspaper in the UK, one of the recipients of the trove of reports from WikiLeaks, describes a 31 March 2006 intelligence report. *The Guardian* [highlights](#) significant Iranian efforts to kill British and American troops in Iraq.³³

One threat assessment [mentions](#) Iranian-supplied rockets containing “neuromuscular” agents that are designed to incapacitate their victims while another warns that an armoured vehicle containing chemical gas is being prepared for a large-scale offensive, backed with multiple rocket launches, against the Green Zone in Baghdad where the US and British embassies and the main Iraqi government buildings are situated.³⁴

The Guardian description of the WikiLeaks file continues,

A potential attack on the Green Zone in Baghdad is ascribed on 31 March 2006 to “unidentified ...members of Saddam Hussein’s former intelligence team.” They are said to be preparing to send a car bomb packed with rockets and missiles containing chemical gas. The car will be an armoured black GMC Suburban with tinted windows, in common use among US officials and contractors in the Green Zone.

As of 15 March [2006] the vehicle was in a village west of Baghdad, according to an intelligence report. “The vehicles came from Syria or Iran. No further information,” it says. The vehicles and rockets will be fired by people unknown to the car bomb organisers. The aim of the rockets is to distract attention at a checkpoint to allow the car bomb to detonate at the checkpoint and spread gas across the Green Zone.

The publicly accessible WikiLeaks texts do not mention any MEK plots against the Green Zone. If the MEK were involved in a plot against the Green Zone, one would expect formerly classified military intelligence would substantiate MEK involvement. However, the once classified WikiLeaks 31 March 2006 document describes Iran, not the MEK, as a perpetrator of a plot against the Green Zone.

Further, in Footnote 3 of its July 2010 ruling, the Court [stated](#):

³² <http://wikileaks.org/>

³³ <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/22/iran-role-iraq-war-ieds>

³⁴ <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/iraq/warlogs/46B4233F-C0DA-4EFC-90C4-7F5AC06B4B6F>

Among the disclosures in the declassified material: “the MEK trained females at Camp Ashraf in Iraq to perform suicide attacks in Karbala;” ... “an August 2008 U.S. Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Assessment, clearly states that the MEK retains a limited capability to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism;” ... Suppl. Admin. R. (filed Oct. 27, 2009).³⁵

Because the Court ruling paid so much attention to the Karbala allegation, this study gives it special treatment. In this regard, the Karbala claim against the MEK is trumpeted by a main vehicle for the Iranian regime in Iraq—*al-Forat* TV; it announced on 18 June 2008 that “25 suicide bomber women in Camp Ashraf affiliated ... [with] the ‘Khalq Organization’ [referring to the MEK] are stationed in the Hamrein mountains.”

And in a later news account (10 August 2008), *al-Forat* TV reported:

...excommunicated groups [MEK] resorted to new terrorist methods against innocent civilians, this time using suicidal women. According to a report prepared in this regard, most of these women are insane and are easy targets for terrorist groups...The Diyala Province has witnessed the most number of suicide attacks by women due to the presence of excommunicated groups and terrorist organizations such as the ‘Khalq Organization.’

An indication the Iranian regime planted the Karbala story in the media is that on 12 September 2007, dozens of the regime’s media sources, including the *Mehr* News Agency, announced:

Before ... [one of the bombings in Karbala], closed-circuit cameras around the Imam Hossein shrine caught a 23-year-old woman and a 13-year-old youngster gathering information from various entrances of the shrines. After their arrest it was revealed that they were dispatched by the ‘Monafeqin’ [“hypocrites,” a word used by the Iranian regime to discredit the PMOI] to identify blind spots to penetrate into the shrine and conduct destructive attacks.

The Iranian regime used its so-called “[Habilian Society](#),” which is supposedly dedicated to families of martyrs of alleged terrorism practiced by the MEK. Tehran’s goal is to misconstrue the Court’s discussion about Karbala as declassified news from the State Department and as evidence the MEK is involved in terrorist activities and has the capability and intention to commit terrorist acts.³⁶

The regime’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) sends members of the Habilian to European countries posing as disaffected former members of the MEK who are now working within a non-governmental organization, the Habilian Society. The aim is to contact European parliamentarians and other officials to tarnish the image of the MEK.

Lord Corbett of Castle Vale, Member of the House of Lords, commented favorably on a European Union declaration confirming the commitment of all member states to take “unified action to expel and prevent the entry of Iran’s intelligence and security personnel to member countries of the European

³⁵ <http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/201007/09-1059-1255582.pdf>

³⁶ <http://www.habilian.com/default-en.asp>

Union.” Lord Corbett also noted that Dutch and German security services had warned in their annual reports about the activities of such Iranian intelligence agents in Europe.³⁷

Other organizations under the direct control of the MOIS that have similar tasks to besmirch the MEK are the Nejat Society, Peyvand, and Aawa Association. Iranian intelligence has also created several websites to complement the work of these organizations, including:

irandidban.com
iran-interlink.org
nejatngo.org
habilian.com
iranpeyvand.com
survivorsreport.org

The Habilian Society published the Federal Appeals Court’s description of declassified documentation alleging MEK involvement in Karbala as “news,” and subsequently several of Tehran’s state-run media reproduced the report. It was through such a disinformation campaign that scores of official or regime-influenced media sources published the Habilian report in full.

In a dispatch on 14 August 2010, entitled “Monafeqin” [MEK Hypocrites] maintain readiness to conduct terrorist operations,” the state-run *Fars* News Agency [wrote](#):

According to reports recently published by the U.S. intelligence community, the Monafeqin maintain their readiness to conduct terrorist attacks and resort to violence; based on recently declassified documents, the U.S. intelligence community emphasized...that PMOI’s claim regarding having voluntarily renounced violence in 2001 was nothing but a hoax, and this organization maintains its capability to conduct terrorism.³⁸

For a senior U.S. military commander’s view attesting to the veracity of the MEK renunciation of violence, see the letter in Appendix B stating every one of its member at Camp Ashraf, Iraq had renounced “violence and terrorism” in 2004.³⁹

The Iraqi *al-Forat* TV station had reported this same allegation of MEK readiness to conduct terrorist attacks as “news” earlier, on 10 August 2008, two years before the 16 July 2010 Court ruling; and then again reported the Karbala allegation against the MEK on 14 August 2010, citing the Habilian and claiming, “U.S. court reveals females training in Camp Ashraf to conduct suicide attacks in sacred Karbala.”

The sequence regarding the Karbala report:

³⁷ Letter from Lord Corbett of Castle Vale, a Peer in the House of Lords, the United Kingdom, 16 September 2008.

³⁸ <http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8905230510>

³⁹ Letter from Geoffrey D. Miller, Major General, U.S. Army, Deputy Commanding General, to People of Ashraf, Ashraf, Iraq, 21 July 2004.

First, the Karbala claim appeared in the Iranian regime's state-run media, which most likely was the source for the incident appearing in the U.S. Intelligence Community.

Second, Tehran's media used Karbala more than once under the pretext of commenting on declassified documents from the State Department.

Third, Iran's official media outlets completed the disinformation cycle by publishing the Karbala report citing State's official files and misrepresenting the judgment of a Federal Court of Appeals.

This process is in effect a closed "news and intelligence loop," beginning with the Iranian regime, with classified American documents in the middle, and ending with Tehran reporting declassified U.S. intelligence as "proof" of MEK involvement in terrorist plotting and of its capability and intention to carry out terrorist incidents.

Competing Narratives: Al Qaeda of Iraq's Role as Perpetrator of Terrorism in Samarra, Iraq

The Karbala case is only one of several instances of Iranian regime efforts to make unsubstantiated allegations against its main opposition. Now consider a second incident of alleged MEK involvement in bombing of another holy site—in Samarra, Iraq. Just as Karbala houses the Golden-domed mosque and is revered as a holy city by Shiites, Samarra's Askariya shrine is also known as the Golden Mosque. It contains the tombs of two revered 9th-Century Shiite Imams, including Hassan al-Askari, father of the "hidden imam," al-Mahdi. Shiites consider the mosque in Samarra to be a bond with the hidden imam, and Moqtada al-Sadr's tightly disciplined militia is called the Mahdi Army, reflecting its allegiance to this revered figure.

Regarding the bombing of Samarra of 23 February 2006, some local officials said the bombers were dressed in the uniforms of Iraqi security forces. Investigation into the bombing, however, pointed to "[infiltration](#)" of Iraq's security forces. IPC researchers found convergence among media sites around the idea of al Qaeda of Iraq (AQI) as possible perpetrator of the bombing. Recall that Reuters [suggests](#) AQI as architect of bombings of Karbala.⁴⁰ Similarly, press reports single out AQI as likely perpetrator for bombings of Samarra.

None of the mainstream media reported any charge of PMOI involvement in the Samarra bombings. The *Washington Post*, [23 February 2006](#) states that:

There was no immediate assertion of responsibility for Wednesday's attack. Mowaffak al-Rubaie, Iraq's national security adviser, [a detractor of the PMOI interviewed by the author in 2009] told al-Arabiya television that he believed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's al-Qaeda in Iraq organization may have been the culprit.

⁴⁰ http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2010/11/08/world/international-uk-iraq-violence-pilgrims.html?_r=1&ref=global-home&pagewanted=print

In Sadr City, representatives of Sadr called for restraint and sought to deflect blame from Iraq's Sunnis, the Shiites' rivals for power. Followers came running late Wednesday when a Sadr preacher took up a bullhorn outside Sadr's offices to give the direction that the armed, angry crowds were waiting for. The mosque attack was the work of 'occupiers,' or Americans, 'and Zionists,' said the cleric, Abdul Zara Saïdy. In Iran, Shiite leaders echoed the accusation.⁴¹

The [New York Times](#), 23 February 2006 states:

No group claimed responsibility for the [Samarra] attack, but some Iraqi officials pointed a finger at Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, the terrorist group believed to be responsible for many of the attacks on Shiite civilians and mosques in the past two years.⁴²

The Chinese media also attributed the Samarra attacks to al Qaeda ([Xinhua](#)) 6 September 2006, stating:

Al-Askari shrine, one of the holiest sites for Shiite Muslims, was attacked last year by gunmen believed to be affiliated to the al-Qaida in Iraq network.⁴³

In reference to an earlier bombing, the 28 June 2006 edition of *Xinhua* also failed to attribute any of the Samarra bombings to the MEK; again, fingers pointed toward al Qaeda of Mesopotamia:

[Key figure of al-Qaida in Iraq arrested](#)

A key figure of al-Qaida in Iraq, accused of bombing a Shiite shrine in Samarra and killing an Iraqi female journalist, has been arrested by Iraqi security forces, a senior Iraqi official said on Wednesday.⁴⁴

The IPC also investigated the Samarra case with the assistance of an electronic, publicly available database—National Counterterrorism Center ([NCTC](#))⁴⁵ Worldwide Incident Tracking System ([WITS](#)).⁴⁶

The WITS database is an online catalog of attacks determined by the U.S. Government (USG) to be acts of terrorism. The database supports the Department of State's *Country Reports on Terrorism* (CRT); assists publication of the NCTC Report on Terrorism; and answers requests from officials about terrorism trends and patterns. Based on WITS data, the NCTC was responsible for creating the Press Conference slides for the rollout of CRT 2009. See a list of NCTC/WITS [published reports](#), including the CRT 2009 presentation.⁴⁷

⁴¹ <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/22/AR2006022200454.html>

⁴² http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/23/international/middleeast/23iraq.html?_r=2&pagewanted=1

⁴³ http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-09/07/content_6678077.htm

⁴⁴ http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-06/28/content_4765066.htm

⁴⁵ <http://www.nctc.gov/>

⁴⁶ <https://wits.nctc.gov/FederalDiscoverWITS/index.do?N=0>

⁴⁷ http://www.nctc.gov/witsbanner/wits_subpage_reports.html

With respect to the methodology used to compile the NCTC Worldwide Incident Tracking System (WITS), see:

National Counterterrorism Center, 2009 Report on Terrorism, 30 April 2010, [Methodology Utilized to Compile NCTC's Database of Terrorist Incidents](#)⁴⁸

Traditionally, NCTC only attributed attacks to perpetrators when a claim of responsibility was made or if reporting supported a belief that a particular perpetrator was responsible. Only those groups that have already been designated as foreign terrorist organizations by the State Department, have themselves claimed responsibility for terrorist actions or status as a terrorist group, or have been repeatedly and reliably suspected of involvement in specific terrorist activities are included in WITS.

Regarding credibility, WITS provides criteria for assessing the confidence its analysts have in any allegation of an incident:

Confidence [Credibility Criterion]:

Plausible; Unknown; Likely

To comply with instructions of the Federal Appeals Court, one would expect the Department of State to examine the confidence level of credibility for its classified and unclassified allegations against the MEK: It is the testimony of the Government that the Secretary made her January 2009 designation decision on the basis of the record as a whole, which would include both classified and unclassified sources. Once the Department submits its response to the Court, one would be able to assess whether State has complied with the instructions. Unless the classified Administrative Record contains sources for what became the unclassified assertions, however, it may be difficult for State to adhere to the ruling of the Court to demonstrate the credibility of unclassified material the Department used in continuing the designation.

In the IPC searches, analysts found no matches between claims of MEK involvement in the Samarra attacks and information in the WITS database. As with the case of Karbala, there is a lack of independent confirmation to sustain the claims by the Iranian regime of MEK involvement in the Samarra bombings. The lack of evidence in the WITS database and in the mainstream media leads to the conclusion that such allegations by the Iranian regime of terrorism against the MEK lack confirmation and hence are not credible.

Assessment of Credibility of Allegations against MEK—Tehran's Unsubstantiated Claims, 2009 and 2010

Table 1 contains an assessment of the credibility of Iranian regime sources, in particular, the *Fars* News Agency. As Table 1 states, *Fars* is a state-run entity in Farsi language known for its affiliation with the

⁴⁸ http://www.nctc.gov/witsbanner/docs/2009_report_on_terrorism.pdf

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC); *Fars* is a “mouthpiece” of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Table 1 compares *Fars* claims about the MEK with the Worldwide Incident Tracking System (WITS). There is no confirmation of allegations, which suggests the need to use such an unclassified information source to balance classified intelligence, which may be tainted by propaganda from the regime, e.g., by such allegations as found in *Fars*.

Using interviews with former members of the U.S. intelligence as a guide, it is clear that Iranian State media has an unreliable track record as a reporting source about its opposition. None of the allegations mentioned in *Fars* reports in Table 1 turned out to be validated by WITS.

Defining credibility as how much of what the same source has reported in the past has turned out to be true, Iranian State media would receive a very low grade; Tehran is not a credible source about the MEK, to say the least. Accusations in regime-controlled media are not in accord with other streams of reporting, and Tehran’s media disseminates information that is simply implausible on its face.

One questionable charge also discussed above is in Table 1. While female members of the MEK were under the watchful eye of the U.S. military in Camp Ashraf, Iraq, they were supposedly able to receive training to become suicide bombers and leave the Camp unescorted to commit their suicide bombing tasks.

In the Appendix B to this study are letters to the MEK members in Camp Ashraf in 2005 and 2006, respectfully, from Generals Brandenburg and Gardner. The letters attest to the control the U.S. military exercised over Camp Ashraf as part of the process of providing “protected persons” status to the residents of Ashraf. These documents demonstrate how unlikely it would be for suicide training to be conducted in Ashraf and a group of women could travel unescorted to become suicide bombers.

If the Iranian regime’s allegations about the MEK were true, it should be possible to confirm them with independent information; but there is no validation of Tehran’s accusations against the MEK in these eight important incidents. They are typical of the kind of charges the regime frequently levies against its main opposition, the MEK.

There is a credibility gap between the Iranian regime’s accusations about the MEK as perpetrator of terrorist acts in Iran and Iraq and an independent assessment by an unimpeachable source—the Worldwide Incident Tracking System (WITS), which is the main source for U.S. Government data on terrorism.

Events from the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS)

The following incidents are taken from a search of the WITS database using the terms “Mujahedeen-e-Khalq,” “Khalq Organization,” and “Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization” (These incidents also appear in the Appendix in Table 1.) Those terms reflect the spelling of the MEK in the WITS database.

On 12 June 2005, in Tehran, Iran, three bombs exploded in separate locations throughout the capital. At approximately 8:10 PM, at the junction between Safa Ave. and Shohada Ave., a bomb hidden in a garbage can exploded near a bus stop, killing between one and two civilians,

wounding between three and four others, and damaging the bus stop and the surrounding neighborhood. At approximately 9:15 PM, at the Iran Computer Center on Valiasr Ave., near Imam Husayn Square, a bomb exploded, causing an unspecified number of possible injuries and damaging the Computer Center and the surrounding neighborhood. At approximately 11:40 PM, on Vashqani Street, in the Vahidiyeh District, a bomb exploded in front of a cleric's residence, causing minor damage to the home and surrounding neighborhood, but no injuries. No group claimed responsibility, although some sources blamed Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) for the attacks.

On 12 June 2005, in the morning, in the Paddadshahr area of Ahvaz, Khuzestan, Iran, three bombs exploded twenty minutes apart at three different locations throughout the city. One bomb exploded in a parked car outside of the Khuzestan Governor's office; the second bomb exploded in a restroom inside the Housing and Urban Development Organization; and the third exploded in a restroom inside the Management and Planning Organization. According to Iranian official reports the three explosions killed eight persons, wounded 74 others, damaged all three government buildings, destroyed between three and four cars, and caused unspecified damage to the surrounding neighborhoods. Reports by Iranian local and national press gave victim counts ranging from 3 killed and 30 wounded on the low end to eight killed and 90 wounded on the high end. Four groups claimed responsibility (Arab Martyrs of Khuzestan, Afwaj al-Nehzat aw al-Mosalahat al-Ahvaz, the Arab Democracy Movement, and Aba-Bakr), while five others were blamed for the attack (Al-Qa'ida, Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK), the Ba'athist, Popular Democratic Front of Ahvazi Arabs, and Battalion of Revolutionary Martyrs of Ahvaz).

On 12 June 2005, in the morning, in Ahvaz, Khuzestan, Iran, authorities attempted to defuse a bomb that had been planted in front of the house of the head of a provincial radio and television station, failing and causing the device to explode. The victims and damage related to this incident were not specified. Four groups claimed responsibility (Arab Martyrs of Khuzestan, Afwaj al-Nehzat aw al-Mosalahat al-Ahvaz, the Arab Democracy Movement, and Aba-Bakr), while five others were blamed for the attack (Al-Qa'ida, Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK), the Ba'athist, Popular Democratic Front of Ahvazi Arabs, and Battalion of Revolutionary Martyrs of Ahvaz).

On 31 October 2005, at 8:30 PM, in Al Basrah, Iraq, assailants detonated a roadside command-initiated vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) on Algiers Street as a police patrol passed, killing 15 civilians and five police officers, wounding 71 civilians, and damaging several restaurants, businesses, vehicles and a public market. No group claimed responsibility although security personnel suspected involvement by the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK).

In almost seven years, there are only four allegations that mention the MEK; other organizations claimed responsibility for three of the incidents, and in none is the MEK accused directly. The MEK is only "suspected" or "blamed" by unknown sources along with several other groups in the incident description. Also, during this time, MEK members were in Camp Ashraf monitored by U.S. military seven days a week, 24 hours a day.

Events from the Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland (GTD)

Table 2 contains a spreadsheet of another list of incidents. GTD is a university-based research center committed to the study of causes and consequences of terrorism in the United States and worldwide. Based at the University of Maryland, GTD supports research efforts of leading social scientists at more than 50 academic and research institutions.

Consider an advanced search of the Maryland database for the Mujahideen-I-Khalq. That search [lists](#) 111 incidents from 1970 to 2001 using that search term under the criterion of including, “All incidents regardless of doubt.”⁴⁹ Again, no alleged terrorist incident where the MEK is perpetrator is listed between early 2001 until the first quarter of 2008. (No later data are available.)

Regarding the credibility of sources, a member of the IPC research team conducted a telephone interview on 11 October 2010 with Erin Miller, Global Terrorism Database (GTD) Project Manager. Below are the findings of that interview, with special reference to credibility of sources.

- 1) GTD sources are almost always news articles, rarely primary sources.
- 2) GTD uses a scale of credibility to assess its sources.
- 3) There is no formal process for determining a source’s credibility though several people review each decision.
- 4) GTD is broken into two distinct data sets: GTD I and GTD II. Data inherited from Pinkerton Global Intelligence Service are in GTD I, and it covers 1970-1997. It is important to note that GTD I contains no information about the credibility of sources. Only in cases after 1997 does the GTD attempt to assess the credibility of its sources.
- 5) GTD almost never uses a non-credible source (a 1 or 2 on the scale) as the sole source of information on a terrorist incident. Non-credible sources are paired with a more credible source (a 3 or 4 on the scale).
- 6) However, there is no way to determine which source identifies specific information in the incident report: If an incident report cites a source from a non-credible Iranian source and from the Associated Press, it is possible that all of the technical information about the incident came from the AP source, while the allegation against the MEK came from the Iranian source. The perpetrator claim could come from either source.
- 7) The GTD will indicate that there was a claim of responsibility if the incident source identifies such a claim, even if other sources say differently. In cases where sources do not agree with each

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http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=&end_yearonly=&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&perpetrator=470&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=

other regarding claims of responsibility, the GTD inputs the variable “No” or “Unknown” in the “Confirmed” category

8) GTD cannot distribute its sources due to copyright issues.

The main significance of the GTD interview is that its high concern for credibility of sources allows GTD unclassified information to be an excellent candidate to complement classified data in the unredacted Administrative Record.

Events from the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI)

Table 3 is from RAND, which states:

The RAND Corporation created a database ([RDWTI](#)) that incorporates two earlier RAND archives, the RAND Terrorism Chronology Database and the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database. The RAND Terrorism Chronology Database recorded international terrorist incidents that occurred between 1968 and 1997. RAND defines international terrorist incidents as attacks committed by someone other than a citizen of the country in which the assault occurred, or those requiring attackers to cross international borders. The RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database records domestic and international terrorist incidents from 1998 to 2008. Ongoing data collection also includes both international and domestic terrorism incidents.

A search for Mujahideen-I-Khalq [this is the spelling used by RAND] in the [RDWTI](#) lists 18 incidents from 1975 to 2001, alleging involvement of the Mujahideen-I-Khalq. No alleged terrorist incident is listed between early 2001 until 31 December 2009. (No later data are available.)

The latest incidents associated with the Mujahideen-I-Khalq occurred in 2001. Below are the descriptions of two incidents in 2001 that RDWTI identifies the Mujahideen-I-Khalq as perpetrator:

From an incident on 21 JAN 2001: Mortar shells were fired at government buildings in Tehran’s Motahari neighborhood, including the Supreme Court. No one was hurt.

From an incident on 7 JAN 2001: Five rockets were fired at the general command of the Internal Security Forces in northern Tehran. Several people were either killed or injured. The Iraq-based Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MKO) claimed the attack.

RDWTI does not list any incidents after 21 JAN 2001 where the Mujahideen-I-Khalq is perpetrator.

The search of the RAND (RDWTI) database reinforces conclusions derived from searches of the WITS and GTD: There is a convergence among the three regarding the absence of incidents in which the MEK is perpetrator on the basis of credible reporting after 2001.

In addition to electronic databases and mainstream media reports, this study investigated the 2003 and 2009 redacted Administrative Records provided by State as well as the Department’s *Country Reports on Terrorism* for allegations about the MEK.

Redacted Administrative Records and Department of State *Country Reports on Terrorism*

2003 Administrative Record

Fund solicitation, material support, and planning are three areas of charges against the MEK in the redacted 2003 Administrative Record.

Although fund solicitation references a court case, as the July 2010 ruling of the Federal Appeals Court states, it is not clear to what part of the relevant antiterrorist statute the funding charge is directed. The allegations of material support and planning, moreover, rely on initial press accounts but omit reports that exonerate the MEK. Such a selective use of evidence diminishes the credibility of the charges and may indicate the Government seeks to bolster the case for designation rather than determine if the MEK deserves listing as an FTO.

The 2003 Record cites stories in the press of a [17 June 2003 French raid outside of Paris of MEK sites](#).⁵⁰

The Record states that French authorities believed the MEK was using the sites as organizational, logistical, and operational bases for financing and conducting terrorist activities. The Record, however, failed to state that “[most of those detained were set free for lack of hard evidence against them](#),” within 24 hours, and the rest were released later.⁵¹

The 2003 Record lists sources like *Patterns of Global Terrorism* 2003, which is the former name of *Country Reports*; a letter from the FBI of 22 August 2002; and provides an Action Memorandum approved 24 May 2003 regarding 2001 and 2003 designations of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, the parliament in exile of which the MEK is the largest unit but that the State Department considers an alias of the MEK.

2009 Administrative Record

The [redacted] Supplemental Administrative Record, filed 27 October 2009 relies on a 13 March 2008 Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Assessment. The assessment acknowledged the MEK had not committed any “terrorist attack” (conducted military operations against the Iranian regime is how the MEK would state its own case) since 1999. The Threat Assessment, however, grants an absence of attacks but cautions that the MEK retains a paramilitary capability:

⁵⁰ <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/18/world/french-arrest-150-from-iranian-opposition-group.html?scp=1&sq=french%20arrest%20150%20from%20iranian%20opposition%20group&st=cse>

⁵¹ <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/25/world/iranian-rebel-group-had-attack-plans-french-report-says.html?scp=5&sq=french%20arrest%20150%20from%20iranian%20opposition%20group&st=cse>

The Community assesses the MEK would act violently against members who desert Camp Ashraf, or in some cases might evict some of its own members from the camp, making them vulnerable to Iranian Government attack.

Although the unredacted version might contain probative and dispositive evidence to the contrary, IPC research at Camp Ashraf and interviews with former U.S. military officers stationed there in 2008 and once stationed at Ashraf revealed nothing in MEK practices that warrants such inferences.⁵² The only sources that consistently make such allegations are Iranian-controlled websites and media.

Quoting from the U.S. Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Assessment, the 2009 Administrative Record uses the following language.

The Assessment

“**Clearly** [Emphasis added] states that the MEK retains a **limited** [Emphasis added] capability to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.”

And despite having renounced violence in 2003, “**limited** [Emphasis added] intelligence reporting indicates that the group has not ended military operations, repudiated violence, or completely or voluntarily disarmed [footnote omitted].”

“The IC assesses that although there has not been a confirmed terrorist attack by the MEK since the organization surrendered to Coalition forces in 2003, the MEK retains a **limited** [Emphasis added] capability and the intent to use violence to achieve its political goals [footnote omitted].”

The repetition of the term “limited” suggests there is less confidence in the Assessment than the term “clearly” warrants, and there may be doubts in the Intelligence Community about the credibility of the intelligence sources on which the Assessment relies.

Concerning planning and preparation for conduct of terrorist activity, the 2009 Record states as of January 2008, there were “persons associated with al Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) planning to attack the international zone in Baghdad.” But then the Record makes a stunning statement in the form of a separate comment: “The ultimate sources of the information... [were] unknown and as such, their access, veracity, and motivations were unknown.”

If such an allegation were typical of “evidence” in the unredacted (classified) version of the 2009 Administrative Record, its credibility would be near zero. In the public domain, moreover, the only sources that mention plots and coordination between AQI and the MEK are Iranian regime websites and media outlets.

There also are references in the redacted Record to 17 January 2008 classified reports of an MEK plan to attack Iraqi pilgrims en route to the holy City of Karbala to worship and **possible** (Emphasis added) MEK plans to conduct and assault of the International Zone in Baghdad.

⁵² Raymond Tanter, *President Obama and Iraq*, Washington DC: The Iran Policy Committee, 2009.

In view of the insertion of the word “possible” in describing the alleged Baghdad plan, the State Department appears to acknowledge that the evidence is weaker and therefore less credible for Baghdad than for Karbala. But even for Karbala, the very idea that the MEK would be able to train suicide bombers in full view of the U.S. military stationed at Forward Operating Base Grizzly and have them travel without American military escort to Karbala to commit mass murder is incredible on its face.

Indeed, when asked about allegations of MEK engaging in bombings and kidnappings in Iraq, Major General William Caldwell, Spokesman for the Multi National Force-Iraq, [said](#) on 20 July 2006,

The MEK is out at Ashraf in a secure military facility that the coalition forces, in fact, guard on a 24-by-7 basis. They're under continuous surveillance and control...Currently, they're not operating within the country of Iraq. They're in a fenced-in facility, a very large facility out there, and there is [sic] quite a few coalition forces that are there continuously guarding that facility to make sure they in fact are not allowed access out of it, and if it is, it's a controlled access, where they are in fact...escorted the entire time.⁵³

The statement by General Caldwell makes it abundantly clear that allegations about MEK planning terrorist attacks in Iraq or training and sending female suicide bombers from Camp Ashraf would have been inconceivable without the knowledge of the U.S. military.

In view of this analysis of Administrative Records of 2003 and 2009, and the statement by General Caldwell, consider an assessment of how *Country Reports on Terrorism*, 2004-2009 treats the MEK.

Comparison of Country Reports on Terrorism 2009 with earlier Reports, especially about MEK Capability and Intent

There are three kinds of terrorist charges against the MEK in the *Country Reports on Terrorism* (CRT).

- First, there are allegations of MEK involvement in incidents against the United States, such as killing American nationals in the 1970s.
- Second, there are allegations of MEK “terrorism” against the Iranian regime prior to 2001.
- Third, there are nonterrorist accusations, such as the MEK is alleged to be a “cult.”

The first two allegations fall well outside of the statutorily-mandated timeframe for maintaining the designation. And the third, the nonterrorist allegations, has no relevance to the statutory definition of terrorism or terrorist activity.

Alleged events of almost four decades ago do not meet the statutory criteria for designating an organization. At issue is why allegations irrelevant to being listed as a terrorist organization appear as

⁵³ <http://www.usf-iraq.com/news/press-briefings/operations-update-july-20>

activities of a listed organization. However, due to importance of some of these allegations in creating an environment that makes designation more likely, this study includes them.

Below is the full text of CRT 2009 about alleged activities of the MEK, followed by a comparison of 2009 with earlier *Country Reports*.

Activities: The group's worldwide campaign against the Iranian government uses propaganda and terrorism to achieve its objectives. During the 1970s, the MEK staged terrorist attacks inside Iran and killed several U.S. military personnel and civilians working on defense projects in Tehran. In 1972, the MEK set off bombs in Tehran at the U.S. Information Service office, a U.S. diplomatic facility staffed by internationally protected persons, the Iran-American Society, and the offices of several U.S. companies to protest the visit of President Nixon to Iran. In 1973, the MEK assassinated the deputy chief of the U.S. Military Mission in Tehran and bombed several businesses, including Shell Oil. In 1974, the MEK set off bombs in Tehran at the offices of U.S. companies to protest the visit of then U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger. In 1975, the MEK assassinated two U.S. military officers who were members of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group in Tehran. In 1976, the MEK assassinated two U.S. citizens who were employees of Rockwell International in Tehran. In 1979, the group claimed responsibility for the murder of an American Texaco executive.

In 1981, MEK leadership attempted to overthrow the newly installed Islamic regime; Iranian security forces subsequently initiated a crackdown on the group. The MEK instigated a bombing campaign, including an attack against the head office of the Islamic Republic Party and the Prime Minister's office, which killed some 70 high-ranking Iranian officials, including Chief Justice Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, President Mohammad-Ali Rajaei, and Prime Minister Mohammad-Javad Bahonar. These attacks resulted in a popular uprising against the MEK and an expanded Iranian government crackdown that forced MEK leaders to flee to France. For five years, the MEK continued to wage its terrorist campaign from its Paris headquarters. Expelled by France in 1986, MEK leaders turned to Saddam Hussein's regime for basing, financial support, and training. Near the end of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, Baghdad armed the MEK with heavy military equipment and deployed thousands of MEK fighters in suicidal, mass wave attacks against Iranian forces.

The MEK's relationship with the former Iraqi regime continued through the 1990s. In 1991, the group reportedly assisted the Iraqi Republican Guard's bloody crackdown on Iraqi Shia and Kurds who rose up against Saddam Hussein's regime. In April 1992, the MEK conducted near-simultaneous attacks on Iranian embassies and installations in 13 countries, demonstrating the group's ability to mount large-scale operations overseas. In June 1998, the MEK was in a series of bombing and mortar attacks in Iran that killed at least 15 and injured several others. In April 1999, the MEK targeted key Iranian military officers and assassinated the deputy chief of the Iranian Armed Forces General Staff, Brigadier General Ali Sayyaad Shirazi.

In April 2000, the MEK attempted to assassinate the commander of the Nasr Headquarters, Tehran's interagency board responsible for coordinating policies on Iraq. The pace of anti-Iranian operations increased during "Operation Great Bahman" in February 2000, when the group launched a dozen attacks against Iran. One attack included a mortar attack against a major

Iranian leadership complex in Tehran that housed the offices of the Supreme Leader and the President. In 2000 and 2001, the MEK was involved in regular mortar attacks and hit-and-run raids against Iranian military and law enforcement personnel, as well as government buildings near the Iran-Iraq border. Also in 2001, the FBI arrested seven Iranians in the United States who funneled US\$ 400,000 to an MEK-affiliated organization in the UAE, which used the funds to purchase weapons. Following an initial Coalition bombardment of the MEK's facilities in Iraq at the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom, MEK leadership negotiated a cease-fire with Coalition Forces and surrendered their heavy-arms to Coalition control. Since 2003, roughly 3,400 MEK members have been encamped at Ashraf in Iraq.

In 2003, French authorities arrested 160 MEK members at operational bases they believed the MEK was using to coordinate financing and planning for terrorist attacks. Upon the arrest of MEK leader Maryam Rajavi, MEK members took to Paris' streets and engaged in self-immolation. French authorities eventually released Rajavi. Although currently in hiding, [sic] Rajavi has made "motivational" appearances via video-satellite to MEK-sponsored conferences across the globe.

According to evidence which became available after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the MEK received millions of dollars in Oil-for-Food program subsidies from Saddam Hussein from 1999 through 2003. In addition to discovering 13 lists of recipients of such vouchers on which the MEK appeared, evidence linking the MEK to the former Iraqi regime includes lists, as well as video footage of both Saddam Hussein handing over suitcases of money to known MEK leaders, and of MEK operatives receiving training from the Iraqi military.⁵⁴

It is noteworthy that *Country Reports on Terrorism 2009* (CRT) fails to provide sources for its allegations about terrorist activities of the MEK. As a result, it is difficult to assess credibility of sources used to generate the *Country Reports*. But it is possible to compare CRT 2009 with prior Reports as well as with the public record from electronic databases and qualitative press accounts of incidents alleged to occur and are too significant for a database collection to miss.

Since adding the Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MEK) to the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) in 1997, the State Department has used varying language to describe the group and justify its terrorist designation in *Country Reports on Terrorism* (CRT), especially regarding capacity and intention to launch terrorist assaults.

CRT 2006 [states](#):

MEK leadership and members across the world maintain the **capacity and will** to commit terrorist acts in Europe, the Middle East, the United State, Canada, and beyond. [Emphasis added]

The MEK advocates the **violent** overthrow of the Iranian regime... [Emphasis added]⁵⁵

⁵⁴ <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/140900.htm>

⁵⁶ <http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?nn=8803301258>

CRT 2007, 2008 and 2009 omit the accusation in 2006 that the MEK maintains “capacity and will” to conduct terrorist acts. Similar to CRT 2007, the 2008 version states the MEK...further developed its paramilitary skills,” hinting but not directly alleging that the MEK retains capability to launch terrorist acts; but CRT 2009 omits the 2007 and 2008 statements about paramilitary skills, suggesting there is less confidence at the State Department that the MEK retains capacity and will to conduct terrorism or terrorist activity.

There is a shift in language describing the organization among the *Country Reports on Terrorism* for 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 from negative to less negative to very negative to much less negative.

1. Regarding nonterrorist terms, the word “cult” is used to describe the MEK in CRT 2006 but is not repeated in 2009.
2. Of allegations in CRT 2006, three of them concern terrorism; they include killing of Americans in 1970s; support for 1979 takeover of U.S. embassy Tehran; and terrorist capacity and will.
3. In CRT 2007, 2008, and 2009, the 2006 accusation of “capacity and will” to commit terrorist acts does not reappear, suggesting an increasingly weaker basis for making the allegation the MEK has the capability and intent to engage in terrorism or terrorist activities.

Assessing Credibility of Iranian Regime Allegations: Terrorist Capability and Intent of the MEK

Table 5 contains a list of unsupported allegations from Iranian regime sources concerning capability and intent of the MEK. The table lists the incident descriptions and provides an incident date; however, most of the allegations in this table do not directly relate to a specific terrorist incident. The “incidents” in the table discuss alleged MEK capability and intent to commit terrorist incidents. One describes alleged terrorist training of the MEK.

It is difficult to assess the credibility of accusations concerning capability and intent by using the major databases on terrorism. They do not encompass failed or unfulfilled plots. The December 2009 plot to blow up a Northwest Airliner about to land in Detroit would not make the cut to appear in the databases. Similarly, an allegation concerning training MEK females to become suicide bombers would not be mentioned in the database unless one of those bombers committed an act of terrorism.

However, in all cases of failed or defused terrorist plots, there has been ample evidence and information in the mainstream media showing how particular groups have been engaged in terrorism or terrorist activities. There has been no such reporting about the MEK in the past nine years.

IPC research into unclassified reports and analyses of Intelligence Community has not identified any warning, alert, or assessment that would point to the MEK as posing any threat to the national security of the United States or the security of U.S. nationals. To the contrary, the Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Assessment of 13 March 2008, which was included in the 2009 Administrative Record, states unequivocally, “There is no information to indicate that the MEK is interested in resuming attacks against Iranian targets in the U.S. Homeland or against U.S. interests in general...”

Unsupported allegation: Sabotage and weapons training in Ashraf

[FARS News Agency, 20 June 2009](#):

Two members of the Monafeqin, in custody after the recent uprisings in Tehran, confessed to direct ties with the terrorist Monafeqin grouplet and said that this terrorist grouplet had prepared them for post-election riots and sedition in Iran. In his confession, one of the imprisoned Monafeqin said: I was in Ashraf (the base for the Monafeqin grouplet in Iraq) for three months and underwent training sessions on the use of weapons, setting ablaze buses and attacking bus stations.⁵⁶

Later, the regime's courts said that the actual crime of MEK supporters was sending pictures and reports of demonstrations abroad. Moreover, during anti-government demonstrations, state-run media broadcast hundreds of reports claiming the MEK, the U.S., and the U.K. were all responsible for instigating violence. If one accepts the regime's reports based on remarks by unidentified individuals, then its charges also apply to the U.S. and U.K. governments.

Unsupported allegation: Sabotage and assassination training in Ashraf

[FARS News Agency, 1 August 2009](#): Tehran's Deputy Revolutionary Attorney General said:

According to the confessions made by members of the Monafeqin grouplet arrested in recent riots, these individuals had undergone sabotage and terrorist training abroad and in Camp Ashraf, and their activities were organized.⁵⁷

This was a report on one of the regime's show trials which led to the execution of two people who had been arrested prior to anti-government demonstrations, yet were convicted of causing post-presidential election riots. It appears as if statements made in this "kangaroo trial" were only an excuse to execute these individuals and they lacked credibility.

The [FARS News Agency on 8 and 9 August 2009](#) published two similar reports, both under the same title, yet the text of the second report on the same subject was mentioned in a different way:

We received training and instructions on building Molotov cocktails and setting ablaze buses. FARS News Agency: In the second court hearing reviewing the case of a 'purple coup d'état', Nasser Abdul Hosseini confessed to attempting to convert peaceful gatherings into riots, gathering pictures and films of empty voting stations and sending them to the Monafeqin [MEK], as well as receiving leaflets carrying pictures of the Monafeqin leaders and posting them around universities.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ <http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?nn=8803301258>

⁵⁷ <http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?nn=8805100100>

References to such allegations are intended to justify show trials, death sentences, or the execution of opposition members under the pretext of taking part in violence, terrorist acts, or planning such activities. When reviewing the indictment carefully, it becomes apparent that the only “crime” these individuals are accused of is their participation in peaceful demonstrations as well as gathering pictures and videos and emailing them abroad. The regime gives these activities a terrorist label to justify such injustices.

Unsupported Allegation: Detained PMOI members received terrorist training in Europe

[Fars News Agency, 30 January 2010:](#)

Monafeqin members arrested during the Ashura uprising (27 December 2009) have confessed they received terrorist and riot-instigating training numerous times in this atheist and ‘Mohareb’ grouplet’s base in Iraq and other European countries. They confessed that they had intended to cause insecurity, foment riots, revolts, illegal gatherings and demonstrations during the 10th presidential elections and in subsequent weeks... These actions reveal the role of foreigners, especially the U.S. and the Zionist regime in the riots.⁵⁹

The indictment charges the MEK as well as the U.S. and Israeli governments as being involved in these riots.

Unsupported allegation: Arrest of two terrorist cells of Monafeqin before they acted

[Fars News Agency, 15 June 2010:](#)

Hojjat-ol-Eslam Heidar Moslehi, Minister of Intelligence, stated that members of two terrorist Monafeqin cells were arrested before they could resort to any actions in the country.

In response to the question as to why Monafeqin has again resorted to these actions while it had ceased armed operations in the past nine years, Mr. Moslehi replied: Of course, despite its slogans, the Monafeqin has always been looking for the opportunity to launch terrorist operations. It has carried out terrorist operations whenever it had a chance. The Monafeqin was identified and its principal elements were arrested before they could act.

According to [Fars News Agency](#), The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (State-run radio and television network) broadcast the alleged confessions of two recently-arrested Monafeqin. They “confessed” that they had planned to set off home-made bombs in Poonak Square and the Dampezeshki Street on Thursday, 10 June and Saturday, 12 June 2010.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ <http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?nn=8805170669%20http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?nn=8805180263>

⁵⁹ <http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?nn=8811100271>

⁶⁰ <http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?nn=8903221190>

The broadcast included an interview with Intelligence Minister Moslehi, who did not provide any evidence for his allegations. Neither did the regime ever disclosed the names of those arrested, who allegedly planned to bomb public places, and did not say what became of them. In that interview Moslehi contradicted himself. When recounting the alleged terrorist activities of the MEK, he pointed to the group's political and public relation activities, including sending information outside the country. His assertion that the MEK had attempted to engage in bombing was neither substantiated nor corroborated by any hard evidence.

The same day, 15 June, Reuters [reported](#) that the MEK had denied the arrest of its members in Tehran, adding,

In an email, the opposition group denied these absolutely false claims which it said were part of a misinformation campaign. The opposition group said that by falsely alleging that those arrested had gone from Iraq to Iran, (the Iranian government) is setting the stage for launching an attack on Camp Ashraf in Iraq.⁶¹

Unsupported allegation: Saudi Arabia provides arms to the PMOI

[Fars News Agency, 6 July 2010](#)

Real News Website unveiled cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the terrorist Monafeqin grouplet. It confirmed arms and equipment given at no cost to PMOI by Saudi Arabia... It also said that Riyadh cooperates with the PMOI grouplet, which is listed as terrorist in many countries.

Unsupported Allegation: U.S. secret talks to station PMOI near Iran border/training for terrorist purposes

[Fars News Agency, 26 July 2010:](#)

A Turkish newspaper disclosed that the U.S. is involved in secret negotiations with leaders of the PKK terrorist grouplet in an attempt to station the Monafeqin in the Iran-Turkey-Iraq border triangle before withdrawing its troops from Iraq.⁶²

The Director General of Pishmarga Ministry in the Kurdistan Regional Government had already denied this report and described it as a distortion by the Iranian regime's Ministry of Intelligence.

On 23 July 2010, the Arab-language daily, *Asharq Al-Awsat* [wrote](#):

The Iranian regime's media has published a report claiming the U.S. has the intention of stationing PMOI forces in the Qandil Mountain. The daily quoted the Director General of

⁶¹ <http://ncr-iran.org/content/view/8346/1/>

⁶² <http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?nn=8905041198>

Pishmarga Ministry and Kurdistan Region Guard spokesman General Lewa Yavar as saying, “This report is not true at all.” He added: “Numerous Iranian regime news agencies have called me regarding this issue. I have information that the MOIS is pursuing this matter. I believe this case is a distortion of news or an attempt in the framework of psychological warfare...”⁶³

The above examples demonstrate that the regime is involved in a widespread campaign to disseminate misinformation against the MEK. This review makes it abundantly clear that these reports, almost exclusively based on Iran’s state-run media, have no credibility whatsoever.

Assessing the Credibility of Iranian Regime [WikiLeaks](#) Classified Intelligence to Complement Public Databases

Leaked documents from [WikiLeaks](#) relating to the War in Iraq outline several incidents where Iran provided direct or indirect military assistance to its proxy forces in Iraq. While the overwhelming number of raw documents are not publicly accessible at this time, certain files have been redacted and released by *The New York Times*, *The Guardian*, and *Al Jazeera*. These documents present an image of Iran as heavily involved in subversion and plots against U.S. forces in Iraq. The MEK is noticeably absent from these leaked reports; they offer no confirmation of MEK involvement in violence in Iraq.

Iranian Efforts to Foster Violence in Iraq

First, a WikiLeaks document from 22 November 2005 describes the seizure of explosively formed penetrators (EFPs), the most deadly improvised explosive device (IED) or roadside bomb. These explosives were being smuggled into Iraq from Iran. *The New York Times* [emphasizes](#) that the smuggling of explosives from Iran into Iraq “was a chronic problem.”⁶⁴

Second, a further WikiLeaks file from 5 October 2008 [details](#) Iranian military training of Iraqi proxies. Specifically, the document highlights training in the use of explosives. Another purpose of the Iranian training was to prepare Iraqi proxies to be snipers.⁶⁵

Third, a WikiLeaks document from 27 December 2008 [discusses](#) hidden weapons caches and Iranian training of Iraqi proxies. The report emphasizes diaries discovered in these caches that describe such training of its Tehran’s Iraqi proxies.

Iranian Threats against American Troops in Iraq

Fourth, a WikiLeaks file [describes](#) how the U.S. military had evidence on 31 December 2009 that mortar and rocket attacks against the International (Green) Zone were due to the Baghdad branch of Kataib

⁶³ <http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issueno=11560&article=579262&search=>

⁶⁴ <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/world/iraq-war-logs.html#report/D9E9E0BA-0273-46EE-A998-F2FBDA35951A>

⁶⁵ <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/world/iraq-war-logs.html#report/CBEA1920-423D-4561-50EF2C11CE525E79>

Hezbollah, an Iraqi Shiite militant organization backed by Iran.⁶⁶ Such Iranian regime proxies regularly launched assaults against coalition forces in Iraq.

The MEK, whose members in Ashraf had “protected persons” status under the Fourth Geneva Convention, had warned about the menace of Iranian-sponsored Hezbollah to coalition forces. As early as November 2004, *US News and World Report* [wrote](#):

The dissident Iranian group also provided American intelligence officers with information on how Hezbollah was aiding Iran in gathering intelligence in Iraq. Hezbollah...with close ties to Iran and Syria, collected information on American and British troops, photographed them, and then sent the information to Qods Force commanders in Iran, according to MEK intelligence reports.⁶⁷

Such evidence indicates that the U.S. Government was aware of the particulars of the political, military, and terrorist subversion of the Iranian regime in Iraq. *The Washington Post* [reports](#) that the American military accused Iran of providing extensive, lethal support to Shiite militias in Iraq as part of an effort to weaken the standing of Sunnis in government and engage in a proxy campaign against the United States.⁶⁸

Fifth, another document from WikiLeaks describes an incident on 22 December 2006 detailing Iranian military training of Iraqis for confrontations with the American military. Azhar al-Dulaimi, an Iraqi Shiite militia commander, was trained in Iran. According to the report, he plotted to kidnap American troops in Karbala, Iraq. While his initial plan aborted, Al-Dulaimi’s plot later resulted in the deaths of four American soldiers. *The New York Times* [writes](#), “The [WikiLeaks] report asserts that he was chosen for this mission because of his training in Iran.”⁶⁹

Sixth, a WikiLeaks document [describes](#) a direct military encounter between American and Iranian forces on 7 September 2006. The report indicates that Americans operate under instructions to stay at least one kilometer from the border. While working with Iraqi soldiers, an Iranian with a rocket-propelled grenade launcher threatened the American troops. The incident prompted an American soldier to open fire on Iranian troops.

Iranian Threats against Iraq

Seventh, a WikiLeaks report from 27 March 2007 highlights Iranian efforts to target Iraqi officials. This report [writes](#), “Iranian agents were encouraging attacks against Iraqi officials.”⁷⁰

⁶⁶ <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/world/iraq-war-logs.html#report/E6E5330A-1517-A8F5-4D96B4700BAA1526>

⁶⁷ http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/041122/22iran_7.htm

⁶⁸ http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/22/AR2010102201682_pf.html

⁶⁹ <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/world/iraq-war-logs.html#report/ABD1B1E9-D673-93B1-757861100C0728BC>

⁷⁰ <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/world/iraq-war-logs.html#report/9262EF18-98EF-6825-9B0FDA8A806087DD>

Eighth, a WikiLeaks document from 19 December 2009 [details](#) American and Iraqi raids against persons suspected of working under Iranian instruction. These military activities were conducted by an Iraqi SWAT police unit and assisted by U.S. Special Operations Forces. The United States recognized the threat that Iran was posing to Iraq's stability.⁷¹

In summary, the WikiLeaks reports depict an image of an Iran heavily involved in subversive activities against American and Iraqi troops in Iraq. Moreover, the documents do not mention the MEK. Based on the standard of credibility concerning the absence of evidence as being indicative of the evidence of absence, it is reasonable to infer that the MEK was not a perpetrator of the aforementioned incidents.

Conclusions

This study began with three main research questions:

- What is the optimal proportion of classified and unclassified information?
- Does classified data have enhanced credibility if supported by publicly available information?
- If unclassified information does not support classified material, how credible would it be?

The study finds that overreliance on classified "material" is suboptimal; classified material should be reinforced by publicly available information; and if unclassified information does not support classified material, its credibility diminishes.

Without information on classified sources used by the State Department in designating the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq as a terrorist organization, this study used public databases and media at the time of an alleged incident to infer the validity (reasonableness) of the designation. The three databases are:

1. National Counterterrorism Center Worldwide Incident Tracking System
2. Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland
3. RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents

The results of the respective searches are in Tables 1-5, attached as Appendix A. The main finding of the searches is an absence of evidence to support the inference that the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq engages in terrorism or terrorist activities, or has the capability and intent to do so.

In an interview on 13 October 2010 with a former intelligence official, she mentioned a tendency for country specialists in the Intelligence Community to search for evidence of intention independently of capability; analysts from functional offices, such as those concerned with terrorism in general, would be more inclined to search for evidence of capabilities and infer intent. Regarding this study, Intelligence Community analysts concerned with terrorism may assume capabilities of the MEK; such specialists then would be led to make invalid inferences of MEK intentions.

It should be noted that for a group to get on the FTO list, absent any acts of terrorism or terrorist activity, the State Department has to show that the organization has both the capability and intent to

⁷¹ <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/world/iraq-war-logs.html#report/A5CA9386-B503-8759-A2AD18067BCDF59E>

engage in terrorism or terrorist activity, and that such activity threatens the national security of the United States or the security of U.S. nationals.

A main source of charges that the MEK has capability and intent to commit terrorism is the Iranian regime. Table 5 contains illustrative allegations made by media under the control of Tehran. They lack credibility, in part, because it was not possible to find confirming accounts. Most importantly, however, they lack credibility because since the beginning of 2009, Iraqi forces imposed a complete siege of Ashraf, occupied key parts of the camp, and prevented anyone from going in or out without authorization. Prior to that, Ashraf was under the complete control and monitoring of U.S. forces.

Having surrendered its weapons to the American military and each member having renounced violence, it is quite a stretch to conclude that the MEK possesses a capability and intent to commit terrorism. So, based on the public record, the MEK lacks capability and intent to commit terrorism.

Three main findings emerge from this inquiry:

1. In *Country Reports on Terrorism* (CRT) 2007, 2008, and 2009, the 2006 accusation of “capacity and will” to commit terrorism or terrorist activities does not reappear, suggesting an increasingly weaker basis for making the allegation that the MEK has the capability and intent to engage in terrorism or terrorist activities. One can conclude that the MEK does not have capability and intent to conduct acts of terrorism:
2. In three major databases on terrorism, there are no confirmed associations of the MEK with any military action after 2001. While WITS mentions the MEK in four incidents during 2005, the language used in the descriptions of the events detracts from the credibility of those allegations.
3. Although the Iranian regime blames the MEK for terrorism in Iran since 2001, such allegations lack credibility because they do not appear in the main publicly accessible databases, are not confirmed in a search of other mainstream sources, and come from a biased source.

Given the absence of evidence of MEK involvement in terrorism, as well as lack of capability and intent to conduct terrorist activities demonstrated during the course of nine years (2001-2010), any countervailing evidence in the classified record should be viewed with skepticism, and subject to scrutiny for credibility.

APPENDIX A: TABLES

TABLE 1—ASSESSMENT OF CREDIBILITY OF ALLEGATIONS AGAINST MEK—
TEHRAN’S UNSUBSTANTIATED CLAIMS, 2009

TABLE 2—GTD TERRORIST INCIDENTS ATTRIBUTED TO THE MEK, 1970-2008

TABLE 3—RDWTI TERRORIST INCIDENTS ATTRIBUTED TO THE MEK, 1968-2010

TABLE 4—WITS TERRORIST INCIDENTS ATTRIBUTED TO THE MEK, 2004-2008

TABLE 5—ILLUSTRATIVE IRANIAN REGIME ALLEGATIONS OF MEK CAPABILITY
AND INTENT FOR TERRORISM, 2009-2010

APPENDIX B: LETTERS

7OCT2005, GENERAL BRANDENBURG LETTER TO THE MEK IN ASHRAF, pp. 1-3

16FEB2006, GENERAL GARDNER LETTER TO THE MEK IN ASHRAF

Table Description: This table attempts to reconcile allegations against the MEK with data from the Worldwide Incident Tracking System (WITS). The search used the alleged incident's description and date, erring on the side of including more data.

Significance of Table: While there have been some allegations of terrorism against the MEK after 2001, [the WITS data illustrate a lack of evidence of MEK involvement.](#)

About WITS: WITS is the National Counterterrorism Center's (NCTC) database of terrorist incidents. According to NCTC definition, terrorism occurs when groups or individuals acting on political motivation deliberately or recklessly attack civilians/non-combatants or their property and the attack does not fall into another special category of political violence, such as crime, rioting, or tribal violence. [The WITS database includes data from 1/1/2004 through 3/31/2010.](#)

TABLE 1 - ASSESSMENT OF CREDIBILITY OF ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE MEK - TEHRAN'S				
No.	Unsubstantiated allegations:	Incident Description	Incident Date	Worldwide Incident Tracking System (WITS) CONFIRMATION?
1	MEK perpetrator of explosions of holy Askariain Shrines in Salah e Din province and in Diyala Province in Iraq	FARS News Agency (*), 5 April 2009: "The Director of the 'Assembly to Expel the Monafeqin [MEK] from Iraq' said: The Monafeqin are the main element behind the explosion of the holy Askariain Shrines and the unrests and explosions in Diyala Province, and they must be expelled." http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?n=8801160914	05-Apr-09	LACK of EVIDENCE OF MEK INVOLVEMENT: WITS lists 2 incidents that occurred in Diyala province, Iraq on 5 April 2009, but does not identify the MEK as perpetrator in either case. WITS ID #s: 200902734 and 200902738
2	MEK is responsible for massacre of 60 women and children in an Iraqi village.	FARS News Agency, 6 April 2009: "One of the writers in the Aswat al-Iraq website criticized the position of the Iraqi National Accord Party in support on the Monafeqin and Camp Ashraf and revealed another crime committed by the Monafeqin in Iraq...The Monafeqin murdered 60 women and children in one hour in the area of 'Badreh and Jassan' and no human rights organization have to this day dealt with this issue." http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?n=8801170793	06-Apr-09	LACK of EVIDENCE OF MEK INVOLVEMENT: - WITS does not list any incidents that occurred in the Wasit province in Iraq on or about 6 April 2009

No.	Unsubstantiated allegations:	Incident Description	Incident Date	Worldwide Incident Tracking System (WITS) CONFIRMATION?
3	MEK is involved in terrorist attacks in Iraq	<p>FARS News Agency, 24 April 2009: "One of the former members of Iraq's Parliament stated that the terrorist grouplet of Monafeqin is behind the terrorist attacks in Iraq and said: The Monafeqin, Al-Qaeda and the Baath Party form the three corners of the triangle of terrorism in Iraq." "In yesterday's terrorist attack in the province of Diyala, 65 Iranian pilgrims were martyred and 60 others were wounded. Iraq's Buratha News Agency quoted an eyewitness at the scene and reported that members of the Monafeqin grouplet were involved in yesterday's terrorist attack in the province of Diyala." "The Monafeqin assist Al-Qaeda forces in order to create unrest in Iraq."</p> <p>http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?n=8802040367</p>	24-Apr-09	<p>LACK of EVIDENCE OF MEK INVOLVEMENT - WITS lists 2 incidents that occurred in the Diyala province in Iraq on April 24, 2010, but does not identify the MEK as a perpetrator in either case. ID #s: 200903593 and 200903595</p>
4	Intelligence cooperation between Jundollah and the MEK	<p>FARS News Agency, 2 June 2009: "Abdul Malek Rigi, who a few days ago in a cowardly attack blew up a bomb in the Ali Ebn Abi-Talib Mosque in Zahedan leading to the martyrdom of 25 of our fellow countrymen, has confessed to his relations with the Monafeqin and admitted that the Monafeqin widely support them with information." "With these interpretations one must admit that ... until the Monafeqin have bases in France and Iraq, they will continue their terrorist activities."</p> <p>http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?n=8803121088</p>	02-Jun-09	<p>LACK of EVIDENCE OF MEK INVOLVEMENT- WITS lists 4 incidents that occurred in Zahedan in Iran between May 29, 2009 and June 2, 2009, but does not identify the MEK as a perpetrator in any case. ID #s: 200904706, 200905013, 200905015, and 200905014</p>

No.	Unsubstantiated allegations:	Incident Description	Incident Date	Worldwide Incident Tracking System (WITS) CONFIRMATION?
5	Sabotage and assassination training in Ashraf	<p>FARS News Agency, 1 August 2009: Tehran's Deputy Revolutionary Prosecutor General said: "According to the confessions made by members of the Monafeqin grouplet arrested in recent riots, these individuals had undergone sabotage and terrorist training abroad and in Camp Ashraf, and their activities are organized." "In 2000 I was acquainted with the Monafeqin Organization and in my first serious act in 2004 I entered the armed stage." "In this year I participated in a bombing act in a sensitive location in the city of Tehran."</p> <p>http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?n=8803301258</p>	01-Aug-09	<p>LACK of EVIDENCE OF MEK INVOLVEMENT - WITS does not list any incidents that occurred in Tehran in Iran in 2004.</p>
6	MEK terrorist attack on reporters gathering in Baghdad to make a visit to Camp Ashraf headquarters of the MEK	<p>Fars News Agency, 15 September 2009: "The location in Baghdad where reporters had gathered to head to Camp Ashraf to cover news regarding the expulsion of Monafeqin elements from this camp was attacked by the Monafeqin [MEK]."</p> <p>http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?n=8809241321</p>	15-Sep-09	<p>LACK of EVIDENCE OF MEK INVOLVEMENT - WITS lists one incident that occurred in Baghdad, Iraq on September 15, 2009, but does not identify the MEK as a perpetrator. The report (ID # 200908600) states, "Both the Mujahidin Army (MA) [unrelated to the MEK] and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haqq/Islamic Shiite Resistance (AAH) claimed responsibility, but authorities suspected Shia Islamic extremists were responsible."</p>
7	MEK is involved in bloody explosion in city of Khalis, Iraq	<p>Fars News Agency, April 6, 2010: "In a statement by the Iraqi de-Baathification Movement, the new crime by Monafeqin in the massacre of the city of Khalis was disclosed where dozens of innocent local people were martyred or injured." This statement goes on to add: Preliminary information shows the name of this group has been mentioned in the conclusions of the investigation by security forces about the recent explosion which martyred, injured and maimed dozens."</p> <p>http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?n=8901170637</p>	06-Apr-10	<p>LACK of EVIDENCE OF MEK INVOLVEMENT- WITS lists 12 incidents that match the description given in this report: Occuring in the city of Al-Khalis and wounding / killing "dozens" of people. None of these incidents identifies the MEK as a perpetrator.</p>

No.	Unsubstantiated allegations:	Incident Description	Incident Date	Worldwide Incident Tracking System (WITS) CONFIRMATION?
8	MEK's involvement in bloody bombing in Zahedan (southeastern Iran)	Fars News Agency, 19 July 2010 – "The terrorist attack in Zahedan is similar to Monafeqin's methods. A Member of Parliament's Commission on National Security Hojjat al-Islam Ibrahim said: The evidence shows the type of attack that has taken place in the terrorist incident in Zahedan is similar to Monafeqin's methods...In the Zahedan terrorist attacks, movements can be seen with Monafeqin's role due to the fact that they had a role, with different identities, in all seditions and these types of attacks in the past." http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?nn=8904271744	19-Jul-10	LACK of EVIDENCE OF MEK INVOLVEMENT - WITS does not list any incidents occurring on or about the date of this allegation.
(*) Fars News Agency is a state-run entity in Farsi language known for its affiliation with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC); Fars is a "mouthpiece" of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.				

Analysis and Conclusions:

Lack of confirmation of allegations against the MEK by the Iranian regime from a search of the Worldwide Incident Tracking System data suggests the need to use such an unclassified information source to balance classified intelligence, which may be tainted by propaganda from the regime. Using interviews with former members of the U.S. intelligence as a guide, it is clear that Iranian state media has an unreliable track record as a reporting source about its opposition. None of the allegations mentioned in Fars Agency reports in Table 1 turned out to be true.

Defining credibility as how much the same course has reported in the past has turned out to be true, the Iranian state media receives a very low grade; it is not a credible source to say the least. That media lacks consistency with other streams of reporting, is low on internal consistency, and it reports information that is simply implausible on its face. One implausible charge in Table 1 is that while female members of the MEK were under the watchful eye of the U.S. military in Camp Ashraf Iraq, they were able to receive training to become suicide bombers, and in fact, were able to leave the Camp unescorted to commit their suicide bombing tasks.

If the Iranian regime's allegations about the MEK were true, it should be possible to confirm them with independent information; but there is no confirmation of Tehran's accusations against the MEK in these eight important incidents. They are typical of the kind of charges the regime frequently makes against its main opposition organization, the MEK. There is a credibility gap between the Iranian regime's allegations about the MEK as perpetrator of terrorist acts in Iran and Iraq on one hand, and an independent assessment by an unimpeachable U.S. Government source – Worldwide Incident Tracking System (WITS), which is the main source for U.S. Government data on terrorism. As a part of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), WITS is a principal source for the Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism (CRT); based on WITS data, the NCTC was responsible for creating the Press Conference slides for the rollout of CRT 2009. See a list of NCTC/WITS published reports, including CRT 2009 slides, at:
http://www.nctc.gov/witsbanner/wits_subpage_reports.html

Table Description: This table is a list of every incident that the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) identifies the Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MEK) as a perpetrator. [The GTD covers incidents that occur between 1970-2008. The GTD only lists the MEK as a perpetrator in incidents between 1975-2001.](#)

Significance of Table: Given that the GTD does not identify any incidents after 2001 where the MEK was a perpetrator of a terrorist attack, [it is likely that the MEK has not been involved in acts of terrorism since 2001.](#)

Allegations of Terrorism Against the MEK After 2001: While there have been many allegations of terrorism against the MEK after 2001, [the GTD's data illustrates a lack of evidence of MEK involvement](#)

About GTD: The GTD is comprised of two sets of data: Data from the Pinkerton Global Intelligence Services (PGIS), which covers 1970-1997, and data from the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), which covers 1998-2007. Data since 2007 is collected real-time

TABLE 2—THE GTD COMPLETE LIST OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS ATTRIBUTED TO THE MEK, 1970-2008

DATE	COUNTRY	CITY	PERPETRATOR 1	FATALITIES	INJURED
17/02/2001	Iran	Qasr-e-Shirin	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	Unknown	Unknown
14/02/2001	Iran	Mussian	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	Unknown	Unknown
21/01/2001	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
19/11/2000	Iran	Musian	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
22/10/2000	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	Unknown	Unknown
21/10/2000	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
15/07/2000	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
13/05/2000	Iran	Kermanshah	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	Unknown	Unknown
01/05/2000	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	6
13/03/2000	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	2
05/02/2000	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	1	4
05/02/2000	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	1	5
25/11/1999	Iran	Ahvaz	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	2	8
14/11/1999	Iraq	Al Kut	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	12
26/10/1999	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
02/07/1999	Iran	Dezful	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	Unknown	Unknown
10/04/1999	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	1	0
02/06/1998	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
02/06/1998	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	3	6
02/06/1998	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
13/04/1996	Iran	Esfahan	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
22/04/1994	Iran	Mashhad	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	1
15/04/1994	Iraq	Baghdad	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	Unknown	Unknown
21/03/1994	Iran	Musiyani	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
18/03/1994	Iran	Dehloran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
18/03/1994	Iran	Istgah-e Ahu	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
18/03/1994	Iran	Hoseyniyeh	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	60

DATE	COUNTRY	CITY	PERPETRATOR 1	FATALITIES	INJURED
18/03/1994	Iran	Khorramshar	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	150
18/03/1994	Iran	Ilam	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
17/03/1994	Iran	Naft-Shahr	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
14/03/1994	Iran	Mashhad	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
13/03/1994	Iran	Sari	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
12/03/1994	Iran	Amol	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
12/03/1994	Iran	Bandar-e Torkamen	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
12/03/1994	Iran	Mashhad	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
11/03/1994	Iran	Mashhad	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
11/03/1994	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
10/03/1994	Iran	Lahijan	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
09/03/1994	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
09/03/1994	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
09/03/1994	Iran	Hamadan	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
08/03/1994	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
08/03/1994	Iran	Dehkar	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
07/03/1994	Iran	Esfahan	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
07/03/1994	Iran	Kelachha-ye	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
07/03/1994	Iran	Marand	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
07/03/1994	Iran	Mashhad	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
07/03/1994	Iran	Not Stated	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	2	0
15/10/1992	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
14/10/1992	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
14/10/1992	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
13/10/1992	Iran	Qom	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
13/10/1992	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
12/10/1992	Iran	Ahwaz	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
11/10/1992	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
10/10/1992	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
16/07/1992	Iraq	Abu Saddah	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
16/07/1992	Germany	Potsdam	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
20/05/1992	Iran	Arak	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
05/04/1992	USA	New York	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)		
20/03/1992	Iraq	Baghdad	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
23/12/1991	Iraq	Baghdad	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	2
06/07/1987	Spain	Madrid	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	1
15/03/1985	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	6	0
25/12/1984	Iran	Teheran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	6	50
12/09/1984	Iran	Teheran-Shiraz	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
07/04/1984	Iran	Teheran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	1	Unknown
1982-10-00	Iran	Bahtaran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	2	1
06/09/1982	Iran	Teheran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	20	100
02/07/1982	Iran	Yazd	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	4	11
15/06/1982	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	2
08/04/1982	Iran	Teheran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	1	1

DATE	COUNTRY	CITY	PERPETRATOR 1	FATALITIES	INJURED
1982-01-00	Iran	Unknown	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	3	0
29/09/1981	Iran	Mashhad	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	1	3
24/08/1981	Iran	Rezvanshahr	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	1	0
11/08/1981	Norway	Oslo	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
07/08/1981	USA	Washington	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	3
03/08/1981	Iran	Teheran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	7	10
26/07/1981	Iran	Chalus	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
24/07/1981	Iran	Shohada	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	1	0
23/06/1981	W Germany	Hamburg	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
02/10/1980	Lebanon	Beirut	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	Unknown	Unknown
1980-09-00	Lebanon	Beirut	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	Unknown	Unknown
28/07/1980	Lebanon	Beirut	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	1	0
04/11/1979	Iran	Teheran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
15/01/1979	Iran	Kerman	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	1	0
23/12/1978	Iran	Ahwaz	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	1	0
23/12/1978	Iran	Ahwaz	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	1	0
09/12/1978	Iran	Isfahan	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
16/09/1978	Iran	Tabriz	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	9	Unknown
06/09/1978	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	1	3
19/08/1978	Iran	Abadan	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	430	Unknown
28/12/1977	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	1
16/04/1977	Iran	Tabriz	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
28/08/1976	Iran	Teberan	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	3	0
10/04/1976	Iran	Unknown	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	1	0
30/12/1975	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	1	0
03/07/1975	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	1	0
15/06/1975	Iran	Mashad	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	Unknown	Unknown
14/06/1975	Iran	Mershed	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
21/05/1975	Iran	Teherau	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	2	0
21/05/1975	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	1	0
17/03/1975	Iran	Tehram	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	1	0
03/03/1975	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	1	0
29/10/1974	Iran	Teheran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
11/08/1974	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	1	0
07/03/1974	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
02/06/1973	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	1	0
24/01/1973	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	0
31/05/1972	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	Government	
31/05/1972	Iran	Tehran	Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	0	1

Table Description: This table is a list of every incident that the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI) identifies the Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MEK) as a perpetrator. [The RDWTI covers incidents that occur between 1968-2010. The RDWTI only lists the MEK as a perpetrator in incidents between 1975-2001.](#)

About RDWTI: The RDWTI incorporates two earlier RAND databases, the RAND Terrorism Chronology Database and the RAND-National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (RAND-MIPT) Terrorism Incident Database. The RAND Terrorism Chronology Database recorded international terrorist incidents that occurred between 1968 and 1997. International incidents are defined as attacks committed by someone other than a citizen of the country in which the attack occurred, or those requiring attackers to cross international borders. The RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database records domestic and international terrorist incidents from 1998 to 2008. Ongoing data collection also includes both international and domestic terrorism incidents. MIPT incidents are part of the RDWTI, while the group profiles are hosted by the Global Database on Terrorism (GTD).

Significance of Table: Given that the RDWTI does not identify any incidents after 2001 where the MEK was a perpetrator of a terrorist attack, [it is likely that the MEK has not been involved in acts of terrorism since 2001.](#)

Allegations of Terrorism Against the MEK After 2001: While there have been many allegations of terrorism against the MEK after 2001, [the RDWTI's data illustrates a lack of evidence of MEK involvement.](#)

TABLE 3—THE RDWTI COMPLETE LIST OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS ATTRIBUTED TO THE MEK, 1968-2010

Date	Perpetrator	Description	City	Country	Injuries	Fatalities
03-Jul-75	Mujahideen - I - Khalq (MEK)	IRAN. A car carrying terrorists swerved in front of a U.S. embassy automobile in Tehran. Two men got out (the same two men who admitted to involvement in the May 20 shooting of the two U.S. Air Force officers in Tehran were also accused in this slaying), and opened fire, killing a young Iranian employee of the embassy. It was the third employee of the embassy assassinated in a six week period. The People's Strugglers claimed responsibility.	Tehran	Iran	0	1
28-Aug-76	Mujahideen - I - Khalq (MEK)	IRAN. Three U.S. employees of Rockwell International were assassinated at 7am as they were being driven to work at an Iranian air force installation in Tehran. The People's Strugglers (Mujahiddin e Khalq) used a Volkswagen to cut off the trio's Dodge from the front, while a second car cut them off from behind. Four gunmen jumped out, ordered the chauffeur to lie down, and blasted the car with Polish M-63 machine pistols and a Browning 9-mm pistol. The group then fled on foot and in the rear car. Reports claimed that the briefcase of one of the dead men was also stolen. The three had been working on project IBEX, a \$1 billion electronic surveillance project for the Iranian military.	Tehran	Iran	0	3

Date	Perpetrator	Description	City	Country	Injuries	Fatalities
07-Aug-81	Mujahideen - I - Khalq (MEK)	UNITED STATES. Twenty-four people claiming to be members of the Mujahedeen Khalq took over the Iranian interests section of the Algerian embassy and held six hostages for less than an hour before police broke the siege. Three people were injured in the takeover, including one person who was shot.	WDC	USA	3	0
02-Jul-87	Mujahideen - I - Khalq (MEK)	SPAIN. Iraqi agents are suspected in a car bomb attack on an Iranian diplomat in Madrid. Mohammed Razi, second secretary at the embassy, had become suspicious that something was wrong with his car. He got out to check, but could not escape in time to avoid serious injury. A passerby was also injured by the blast. While Iraqi agents are suspected, an anti-Khomeini group called Mojahedine-e Khalq (also known as Monafiquin) claimed responsibility.	Madrid	Spain	2	0
11-Oct-92	Mujahideen - I - Khalq (MEK)	IRAN. The Iraq-based opposition movement Mujahideen-i-Khalq (MEK) destroyed six Revolutionary Guards vehicles in Qom.	Qom	Iran	0	0
15-Oct-92	Mujahideen - I - Khalq (MEK)	IRAN. The Mujahideen-i-Khalq (MEK) bombed a gas station in Tehran.	Tehran	Iran	0	0
15-Oct-92	Mujahideen - I - Khalq (MEK)	IRAN. The Iraq-based Mujahideen-i-Khalq (MEK) claimed credit for a bomb that went off at the Tehran office of the Revolutionary Guards commander Major General Muhsin Rezaei. Although the building was destroyed, there were no casualties.	Tehran	Iran	0	0
20-Jun-94	Mujahideen - I - Khalq (MEK)	IRAN. An 11lb bomb exploded at the Imam Reza mausoleum in Meshed in northeastern Iran. Hundreds of people had gathered to commemorate the death of Imam Hussein, the third Shite Muslim Imam and descendant of the prophet Mohammad. The People's Mujahedeen, an Iraqi-based opposition group, claimed responsibility stating that the bombing was carried out to commemorate the anniversary of the group's founding on June 20, 1981.	Meshed	Iran	70	25
05-Nov-94	Mujahideen - I - Khalq (MEK)	DENMARK. An Iranian diplomat was the target of an assassination attempt. Members of the Mojahedeen Khalq Organization (MEKO) attacked the diplomat while in his car. Although the car was severely damaged, the diplomat escaped unharmed.		Denmark	0	0

Date	Perpetrator	Description	City	Country	Injuries	Fatalities
20-Feb-96	Mujahideen - I - Khalq (MEK)	TURKEY. Two Iranian dissident members of Mujahedin-e Khalq were killed in Istanbul. A number of Iranians and Turks were arrested in April 1996 in connection with the killing. Islamic militants among the group claimed that Iranian diplomats had ordered the assassinations.	Istanbul	Turkey	0	2
02-Jun-98	Mujahideen - I - Khalq (MEK)	Two people were killed and two injured in an explosion at the Islamic Revolution Court in Tehran. The Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MEKO) claimed responsibility for the attack, stating that the attack was carried out in retaliation for the slaying of eight members of the group in a clash with Iranian security forces last November.	Tehran	Iran	2	2
02-Jun-98	Mujahideen - I - Khalq (MEK)	The People's Mujahideen-I-Khalq Organization (MEKO) launched a mortar attack at the clerical regime's Defense Industries Organization that produces ammunition used by the government to suppress terrorism. The MEKO claimed responsibility for the attack. The explosion ignited other explosive material, causing explosion after explosion for several hours. Casualties were not reported.	Tehran	Iran	0	0
03-Jun-98	Mujahideen - I - Khalq (MEK)	The Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MEKO) claimed responsibility for a huge explosion that destroyed the headquarters of the Revolutionary Prosecutor's Office in Tehran. The office had been used to torture and interrogate criminals. Scores of torturers and interrogators were killed or wounded when the building was demolished.	Tehran	Iran	0	0
19-Jun-98	Mujahideen - I - Khalq (MEK)	Ayatollah Gharavi-Tabrizi was killed along with a number of his companions in the city of Najaf on his way to Karbala. The attackers in the southern town of Najaf sprayed the ayatollah's car with gunfire, also killing the driver and two other people. The Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MEKO) are suspected to have committed this attack.	Najaf	Iran	0	4
22-Jul-98	Mujahideen - I - Khalq (MEK)	Five members of the Mujahideen-I-Khalq Organization (MEKO) attacked the visiting Iranian Industries Minister Gholam Reza Shafe'i and his accompanying delegation as they entered the ministry compound. No injuries were reported.	Rome	Italy	0	0

Date	Perpetrator	Description	City	Country	Injuries	Fatalities
23-Aug-98	Mujahideen - I - Khalq (MEK)	Asadollah Lajevardi, Iranian Revolution Public Prosecutor and Evin Prison Director, was shot and killed by two gunmen affiliated with the Mujahideen-I-Khalq Organization (MEKO). The group later claimed responsibility for the attack. Also killed were Lajevardi's brother and a passerby.	Tehran	Iran	0	3
07-Jan-01	Mujahideen - I - Khalq (MEK)	Five rockets were fired at the general command of the Internal Security Forces in northern Tehran. Several people were either killed or injured. The Iraq-based Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MEKO) claimed the attack.	Tehran	Iran	3	0
21-Jan-01	Mujahideen - I - Khalq (MEK)	Mortar shells were fired at government buildings in Tehran's Motahari neighborhood, including the Supreme Court. No one was hurt. (No claim of responsibility in this description)	Tehran	Iran	0	0

Table Description: This table is a list of every incident that the Worldwide Incident Tracking System (WITS) identifies the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) as a [suspected perpetrator](#). WITS includes data from 2004-2010. WITS only lists the MEK as a suspected perpetrator in incidents occurring in 2005.

Significance of Table: The incidents that WITS associates with the MEK include language like "suspected" and "some sources blamed the MEK." The incident descriptions often lump the MEK in with many other groups, despite the fact that the other groups claimed responsibility for the attacks, while the MEK did not. These descriptions suggest that [it is unlikely that the MEK has been involved in acts of terrorism since 2004](#).

Allegations of Terrorism Against the MEK After 2001: While there have been many allegations of terrorism against the MEK after 2001, WITS data illustrate a lack of evidence of MEK involvement. Every incident in which the MEK is identified contains strong language of doubt concerning their responsibility.

About WITS: WITS is the National Counterterrorism Center's (NCTC) database of terrorist incidents. According to NCTC definition, terrorism occurs when groups or individuals acting on political motivation deliberately or recklessly attack civilians/non-combatants or their property and the attack does not fall into another special category of political violence, such as crime, rioting, or tribal violence. [The WITS database includes data from 1/1/2004 through 3/31/2010](#).

TABLE 4—WITS COMPLETE LIST OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS WHERE MEK IS MENTIONED, 2004-2010

Date	Subject	Country	City	D	W	H	T
12-Jun-05	1 civilian killed, 3 others wounded in 3 bombings by suspected MEK in Tehran, Iran	Iran	Tehran	1	3	0	4
12-Jun-05	8 persons killed, 74 wounded in 3 bombings in Ahvaz, Khuzestan, Iran	Iran	Ahvaz	8	74	0	82
12-Jun-05	Unknown number of victims in failed attempt to defuse bomb in Ahvaz, Khuzestan, Iran	Iran	Ahvaz	0	0	0	0
31-Oct-05	15 civilians, 5 police officers killed, 71 civilians wounded in VBIED attack in Al Basrah, Al Basrah, Iraq	Iraq	Al Basrah	20	71	0	91

TABLE 5: IRANIAN REGIME ALLEGATIONS OF MEK CAPABILITY & INTENT FOR TERRORISM, 2009-2010

No	Unsubstantiated allegations:	Incident Description	Date	CREDIBILITY OF ALLEGATIONS
1	Sabotage and weapons training in Ashraf	FARS News Agency, 20 June 2009: "Two members of the Monafeqin in custody after the recent uprisings in Tehran, after confessing to direct relations with the terrorist Monafeqin grouplet, said that this terrorist grouplet had prepared them for post-election riots and seditions in Iran. One of the imprisoned Monafeqin stated in his confession: I was in Ashraf –the base of the Monafeqin grouplet in Iraq- for three months and I underwent training sessions for the use of weapons, setting ablaze buses and attacking stations. http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?nn=8803301258	20-Jun-09	Credibility of such an allegation is very low. Later the regime's courts said that the actual crime of MEK supporters was sending pictures and reports of demonstrations abroad. Despite the presence of foreign reporters in Iran, researchers could not confirm. Credibility of such an allegation is very low. The report also quotes another person claiming that he underwent weapons training sessions in Ashraf.
2	Unsupported allegation: Sabotage and assassination training in Ashraf	FARS News Agency, 1 August 2009: Tehran's Deputy Revolutionary Attorney General said: "According to the confessions made by members of the Monafeqin grouplet arrested in recent riots, these individuals had undergone sabotage and terrorist training abroad and in Camp Ashraf, and their activities are organized." http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?nn=8805100100 The FARS News Agency on 8 and 9 August 2009 published two similar reports, both under the same title: http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?nn=8805170669 http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?nn=8805180263	01-Aug-09	Credibility of such allegations is very low. Researchers could not locate substantiation.

No	Unsubstantiated allegations:	Incident Description	Date	CREDIBILITY OF ALLEGATIONS
3	Unsupported Allegation: Detained PMOI members received terrorist training in Europe	Fars News Agency, 30 January 2010: "Monafeqin members arrested during the Ashura uprising (27 Dec 2009) have confessed they received terrorist and riot-instigating training numerous times in this atheist and 'Mohareb' grouplet's base in Iraq and other European countries. They confessed to intending to create insecurity, riots, revolt, illegal gatherings, and demonstrations during the 10 th presidential elections and events that followed." http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?nn=8811100271	30-Jan-10	Credibility of such allegations is very low. Researchers could not locate substantiation
4	Unsupported allegation: Arrest of two terrorist cells of Monafeqin before they acted	Fars News Agency, June 15, 2010: "Mr. Moslehi, Minister of Intelligence, stated that two terrorist Monafeqin cells were arrested before they could resort to any actions in the country." http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?nn=8903221190	15-Jun-10	Credibility of such allegation is very low. Researchers could not locate substantiation
5	Unsupported allegation: Saudi Arabia provides arms to the PMOI	Fars News Agency, July 6, 2010 – "Real News Website reported on the cooperation of Saudi Arabia with the terrorist Monafeqin grouplet." http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?nn=8904151535	06-Jul-10	Credibility of such allegation is very low. Researchers could not locate substantiation.



HEADQUARTERS
MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE - IRAQ
BAGHDAD, IRAQ
APO AE 09342-1400

October 7, 2005

MNFI-DCG

Ashraf, Iraq

To The PMOI General Secretary, Madame Sedigheh Hoseini and The Residents of Camp Ashraf

In June of 2004, the residents of Camp Ashraf were determined to be protected by the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention covering alien civilians in a territory of conflict.

Since that date, we believe that Coalition Forces and the residents of Camp Ashraf have greatly benefited from working together to ensure that the rights and protections provided by the Fourth Geneva Convention are enjoyed by the residents of Camp Ashraf, in the spirit of common humanitarianism.

As we approach the first anniversary of this legal determination, I would like to take this opportunity to review important rights and protections under international law that this determination provides to the residents of Camp Ashraf.

- i. The residents of Camp Ashraf have the right to protection from danger, violence, coercion, and intimidation, and to special protection for the dignity and rights of women;
- ii. They have the right to help in contacting their families outside Camp Ashraf, and their families have the right to help in contacting them;
- iii. They have the right to seek assistance from the International Committee of the Red Cross, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and from other international humanitarian organizations;
- iv. They have the right to freedom of thought, religion, expression, intra-community association, and political opinion; they also have the right to freedom from persecution and forced unpaid labor;
- v. They have the right to food, health care, and a quality of living which meets the standards of local residents of the territory in which they are protected;

- vi. They have the right to fair treatment under the law, in accordance with Iraqi domestic law and international standards;
- vii. They have the right to pursue employment opportunities and profit-making activities which are consistent with local laws and can be taken without compromising their overriding right to personal safety;
- viii. They have the right to speak with representatives of the Coalition, the Protecting Power, privately and with confidence in the Coalition's humanitarian interest in their situation;
- ix. They have the right to refuse to return to their country of nationality, regardless of their legal status in the country in which they are protected;
- x. They have the right to depart the territory of conflict at any time for their country of nationality or for any other country for which they possess valid travel documentation.

All of these rights are essential for the protection of the residents of Camp Ashraf, and under the terms of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and they cannot be renounced, either by the residents of Camp Ashraf or by Coalition Forces.

It is important that the residents of Camp Ashraf are aware of the rights they enjoy, and of the ways in which they are able to exercise those rights. It is also important that all residents of Camp Ashraf understand that they are free to depart Iraq at any time, and that Coalition Forces and international and humanitarian organizations stand ready and willing to assist them.

All residents of Camp Ashraf wishing to return to the country of their nationality are eligible for assistance from Coalition Forces, the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which have helped nearly 300 people return to Iran and other countries in recent months.


All residents of Camp Ashraf who do not wish to return to their country of nationality and instead wish to seek an individual or family refugee status determination, and individual or family claims for resettlement in a third country, can request that their cases be referred to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Coalition Forces remain committed to fulfilling the humanitarian mission of ensuring that the important rights provided by the Geneva Conventions – to safety and security, to freedom of thought, to food and shelter – are respected at Camp Ashraf.

Please do not hesitate to contact the JIATF Commander, or to speak to any of the men and women under my command who work alongside them at Camp Ashraf, if you have any questions or concerns about your situation.

Communication is one of the most important tools we have in ensuring that the rights provided to the residents of Camp Ashraf are enjoyed equally by all. We welcome conversation with all of the people of Ashraf, and the men and women under my command look forward to hearing your thoughts and concerns.

Very Respectfully,


William H. Brandenburg
Major General, US Army
Commanding



HEADQUARTERS
MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE - IRAQ
BAGHDAD, IRAQ
APO AE 09342-1400

February 16, 2006

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

Office of the Deputy Commanding General


Secretary General Madame Sedigheh Hosseini
Ashraf, Iraq

Dear Madame Hosseini:

Thank you for your recent inquiry on behalf of the residents of Camp Ashraf regarding the legality of any non-voluntary repatriation of Ashraf residents to their country of origin. Multi-National Force-Iraq appreciates our responsibilities with regard to the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons (GC IV), 1949. In particular, we are sensitive to the requirements established in Article 45 which prohibit the transfer of a protected person to a country in which he or she may have reason to fear persecution for his or her political opinions or religious beliefs.

Finally, I would like to assure you that the coalition remains deeply committed to the security and rights of the protected people of Ashraf and the principle of non-refoulement. We will continue to work with the residents of Camp Ashraf, Iraqi authorities, and appropriate international organizations to resolve the disposition of the Ashraf residents consistent with applicable international law.

Sincerely,



John D. Gardner
Major General, U.S. Army
Deputy Commanding General