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U.S. Policy Options for Iran

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U.S. Policy Options for Iran: Executive Summary

Iran poses six threats to American interests and ideals:

- Drive to acquire nuclear weapons
- Continuing support for and involvement with terrorist networks
- Aid to groups working against the Arab-Israel peace process
- Disruptive role in Iraq
- Expansionist radical ideology
- Denial of basic human rights to its own population

With respect to these threats from Iran, Washington circles largely divide between two alternatives—those who favor engagement with and those who support military strikes against the regime. Few favor regime change as an end in itself.

While the Bush administration does not yet explicitly call for changing the regime, it advocates working with the Iranian people as opposed to the unelected theocracy in Tehran, which is an implicit policy of regime change.

By calling for change in Tehran based on the Iranian opposition instead of the U.S. military, the Iran Policy Committee (IPC) highlights a third alternative: Keep open diplomatic and military options, while providing a central role for the Iranian opposition to facilitate regime change.

IPC joins the debate in Washington over Iran policy initiated by think tank reports on Iran—Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), The Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), and The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (TWI). In contrast to the thrust of such reports, IPC suggests that Iranian opposition groups ought to play a central role in U.S. policymaking regarding Iran.

Comprised of former officials who have worked on the Middle East in the White House, State Department, Pentagon, intelligence agencies, Congress, and experts from think tanks and universities, IPC welcomes the occasion to support the Iranian people in pursuit of U.S. national interests. But continued designation since 1997 of the main Iranian opposition group, Mujahedeen e-Khalq (MEK), as a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department assures Tehran that regime change is off the table. Removing the MEK's terrorist designation would be a tangible signal to Tehran and to the Iranian people that a new option is implicitly on the table—regime change.

U.S. Policy Options for Iran

Introduction

“...liberty in our land depends on the success of liberty in other lands...So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture.

President George W. Bush, Inaugural Address, 20 January 2005

“As you stand for liberty, America stands with you.”

President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 2 February 2005

Using the theme of liberty in general from his Inaugural Address, President Bush refers directly to the Iranian people in his State of the Union Address. In so doing, he tacitly “targets” the regime in Tehran.

The question is what means should the President use to decrease threats posed by Iran:

- Continued negotiations, including positive and negative incentives
- Future military action
- Support for the Iranian opposition.

These options are neither mutually exclusive nor logically exhaustive; but they do reflect courses of action being considered in Washington.

Because the Iranian regime’s policies pose direct threats to national security interests and ideals of the United States Government (USG) and those of its allies and friends, Iran is on the front burner of American foreign policy.

Consider these six Iranian threats to U.S. interests and ideals:

- Drive to acquire nuclear weapons
- Continuing support for and involvement with terrorist networks
- Publicly-stated opposition to the Arab-Israel peace process
- Disruptive role in Iraq
- Expansionist radical ideology
- Denial of basic human rights to its own population

The Iran Policy Committee (IPC) analyzes these dangers and makes recommendations to meet them. It is not the intention of the IPC to duplicate analysis already receiving consideration in policymaking circles; rather, this policy paper offers a distinct perspective and recommends a course of action that is different in key aspects from what has been proposed to date. IPC seeks to build upon the President's disposition to work with the Iranian people by broadening options for American policymakers regarding Iran.

For too long, Washington has been divided between those who favor engagement with and those who support military strikes against the Iranian regime. The Committee stresses the potential for a third alternative: Keep open diplomatic and military options, while providing a central role for the Iranian opposition to facilitate regime change.

President Bush's 2005 State of the Union Address ignores the leadership in Iran in order to converse directly with Iranian people. And it is not his first time doing so; indeed, the President's radio address of December 2002 began the process of having a conversation with the people instead of diplomatic discourse with the regime.

The IPC urges the administration to acknowledge the threat posed to American national security interests by the totalitarian theocracy in Tehran and to adopt a policy that proactively steps forward to defend those interests.

Furthermore, the IPC believes that Washington should support the Iranian people in their efforts to participate meaningfully in a representative government that is responsive to their concerns; implicit in such support is the recognition that the Iranian people have the right to choose and change their own government, as they see fit.

IPC joins the debate in Washington over Iran policy initiated by think tank reports on Iran—Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), The Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), and The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (TWI). In contrast to the thrust of such reports, IPC suggests that Iranian opposition groups ought to play a central role in U.S. policymaking regarding Iran.

Themes running through these think tank reports include the following reasons for dissatisfaction with American policy toward Iran. Critics hold that U.S. policy is not well articulated because of bureaucratic differences; there are too many or too few carrots in relation to sticks; and American policy is not linked enough with Europe's approach to Iran. The reports view

the threat of sanctions and force as well as the promise of diplomacy as complementary tools in the Western arsenal. At issue is the mix between negative and positive incentives, a formula for which there is little accord among transatlantic partners.

While some place the burden on Washington to resolve Iran's nuclear proliferation activities and its state sponsored international terrorism, few place that responsibility directly on the Iranian people. With the possible exception of the CPD, there is too little acknowledgment of a role for Iranians in general and groups opposed to the regime in particular.

As a result, there is a niche for the Iran Policy Committee to address Iranian threats from the perspective of encouraging the people to be principal agents change. Without the active participation of Iranians, moreover, regime change from the outside is unlikely to succeed.

En route to her first overseas mission to Europe on February 3, 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice held that the Iranian people should have a chance to "change their own future," a statement IPC considers as a euphemism for regime change.

Summing up the U.S. government's principal concerns with respect to Iran, Rice further stated that, "The goal of the administration is to have a regime in Iran that is responsive to concerns that we have about Iran's policies, which are about 180 degrees antithetical to our own interests at this point."

While the debate in Washington concerns whether to make explicit its tacit policy of regime change for Iran, the debate in the region is the race between two clocks—a diplomatic and a nuclear timepiece.

On one hand, at issue is whether negotiations can slow down Tehran's march toward nuclear weapons status before Iran acquires such status. The Committee holds that the diplomacy is moving too slowly in relation to nuclear weapons progress.

On the other hand, unless working with the Iranian people rapidly leads to regime change in Tehran, the pace of nuclear weapons development might leave Washington with what the Committee believes is the least desirable option of waging military strikes against Iran.

Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program

Regarding impact in the region, the nature of the regime in Tehran is of greater import than its nuclear weapons capability: An Iran with representative institutions with a nuclear weapons capability would not be as destabilizing as nuclear weapons in the hands of the unelected, expansionist theocracy. The best outcome is a freely-elected, representative government without nuclear weapons; only with such a government would such an outcome be possible.

The nightmare scenario is that a nuclear weapons capability in the hands of an aggressive and repressive regime in Tehran raises the possibility that it could and would collaborate with transnational networks to carry out nuclear terrorism. In any event, of the six critical threats posed by Iran, its drive to acquire nuclear weapons is the first and most urgent.

According to June 2004 testimony by Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, John Bolton, defense experts in the United States strongly believe that Iran has a clandestine program to produce nuclear weapons. Speaking in January 2005, moreover, Bolton told reporters that Iran's repeated support for terrorism makes it particularly dangerous if Tehran were to acquire nuclear weapons.

There have been new revelations about the rapid pace of Iran's nuclear weapons progress since 2002. It is known that Iran is developing its indigenous uranium mines; has built a uranium conversion facility at Isfahan in central Iran; is building a massive uranium enrichment facility at Natanz, which is designed to house tens of thousands of centrifuges plus numerous centrifuge production workshops, a heavy water production plant at Arak, and a laser enrichment facility.

Revelations by diplomatic sources on February 3, 2005 suggest that Iran is testing components of its centrifuge rotors, despite a November 2004 pledge to freeze all such activities related to enrichment. That pledge led to an agreement among Iran's European interlocutors and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to put a hold on U.S. attempts to report Iran to the UN Security Council for violations of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The new revelations deal a serious blow to any hopes that Iran intends to forego uranium enrichment en route to a nuclear weapons capability.

In separate developments on February 3, a spokesman for the main Iranian opposition group charged that Iran has obtained materials and expertise to make neutron initiators (“triggers”) for an atomic bomb. A senior official of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), speaking in Paris, cited secret sources inside Iran’s nuclear development programs. This person accused Tehran of conducting a secret program to develop a nuclear triggering mechanism using smuggled materials. He claimed that Iran has produced or purchased from abroad quantities of polonium-210 and beryllium, two elements required for building a “neutron initiator,” which is an integral part of a nuclear bomb.

The facility where this work allegedly is taking place is a military installation on the outskirts of Tehran, known as Lavizan II. Remarkably, the IAEA has not inspected Lavizan II yet, nor does it appear to be pressing for inspections there, despite the site first being identified by the NCRI in November 2004.

The NCRI has been instrumental in exposing Iran’s secret nuclear facilities in the past. By relying on its network inside Iran of a member organization, the Mujahedeen e-Khalq (MEK), the NCRI revealed a number of significant nuclear sites including Natanz, Arak, Ab-Ali, and Lavizan.

Despite the fact that Iran is a signatory to the NPT, Tehran has repeatedly violated its provisions and continues to play fast and loose with IAEA efforts to monitor compliance. The regime appears to be counting on the apparently inexhaustible patience of the IAEA and the Europeans, who have agreed to compromise after compromise with Iran, to avoid having the issue brought before the United Nations (UN) Security Council, as pursued by the United States. The longer this negotiation takes, the more time Iran has to engage in covert activities, enabling it to acquire fissile materials to build and test nuclear weapons.

In other words, time is on Iran’s side. The world cannot wait for proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” of an Iranian bomb. The risks of delay are too high. The international community should be prepared to act on the recent discoveries of evidence of weapons-related nuclear activities. Discoveries over the past two years, along with the revelations by Iranian opposition groups that Iran is developing a nuclear trigger, constitute “clear and present evidence” of illicit activities that, unless halted, may lead to bomb-making.

The general view among the experts is that, if left undeterred, Iran is only one to three years away from producing a nuclear bomb. Indeed, there are

reports from a secret meeting that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has ordered technicians to accelerate Iran's nuclear program in order to achieve nuclear weapons status by the end of 2005.

There is a notion in certain policy circles that, if Iran feels threatened, the hard-line clerics will be further induced to go nuclear. They propose offering additional security assurances to Iran as an incentive to convince it to give up its nuclear weapons program. Given the nature and behavior of the regime, the more plausible argument is that unless they feel threatened, the Iranian clerical rulers will continue their nuclear weapons program on the assumption they can get away with it. Only the prospect of severe consequences threatening the very existence of the regime could induce them to forego nuclear weapons out of fear of the consequences.

Nuclear Delivery Systems: the Iranian Missile Program

Iran possesses one of the largest missile inventories in the Middle East. It has acquired complete missile systems and developed an infrastructure to build missiles indigenously. During military exercises held in September 2004, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards successfully test-fired a "strategic missile," likely the Shahab-3 rocket, which reportedly has a range of up to 2,000 kilometers and is capable of carrying a 760-1,000 kilogram warhead. The Revolutionary Guards is officially armed with the Shahab-3 missiles.

Taken in combination with Iran's drive to achieve a nuclear weapons capability, its continuing support for radical Islamist terrorist groups and avowed opposition to the existence of Israel, Iran's demonstrated capability to field an intercontinental ballistic missile raises much concern among defense officials of many countries.

In December 2004, Iran's main opposition coalition, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), uncovered a new missile program secretly pursued by Iran, as well as a program to develop a nuclear warhead. The new secret missile, produced at the Hemmat Missile Industries Complex in northeast Tehran, is named Ghadar, NCRI reported. North Korean experts are believed to be assisting the Iranian program at this complex.

The Ghadar missile may have a range of 2,500 to 3,000 kilometers (1,550 to 1,860 miles). NCRI also reported that Iran has improved the guidance and control system of its Shahab-4 missiles, based on a system acquired from China.

In late January 2005, a Ukrainian legislator alleged that Kiev sold nuclear-capable cruise missiles to Iran and China during the period from 1999-2001. The Kh-55 cruise missile has a range of 3,000 kilometers and is capable of carrying a 200-kiloton nuclear warhead.

In addition to Iran's nuclear weapons program and its advanced delivery system, a second threat posed by the regime is its support for and involvement with international terrorist networks.

Regime Support for International Terrorism

The Islamic Republic of Iran is the world's number one state-sponsor of terror. It created Hizballah, supports al Qaeda, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Tehran operates at the heart of a network of terrorist organizations engaged in murder, kidnapping, bombing, and other atrocities calculated to sap the will of the United States and the West to resist.

Iran's logistical, financial and operational assistance takes the form of providing terrorists safehaven, travel documents such as passports, weapons, training and technical expertise.

Information reveals a pattern of operational contacts between the Iranian government and Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda organization. These contacts include: joint planning of terrorist operations, military training of bin Laden operatives inside Iran and by Iranian IRGC and MOIS officers in Syria and Lebanon, financial assistance to clandestine terrorist and surveillance cells, false passports, and communications.

The 9/11 Commission report documented in great detail the logistical, operational, and material support provided by Iran and Hizballah to al Qaeda. This report, released in July 2004, echoes the earlier federal grand jury findings about links between Iran and al Qaeda. The Commission's report stated that Iran's support of al Qaeda dates back to 1991, when operatives from both sides met in Sudan; by 1993, "al Qaeda received advice and training from Hezbollah" in intelligence, security, and explosives, especially in how to use truck bombs. The training took place in the Beka'a Valley, Hizballah's stronghold in Lebanon.

According to the 9/11 commission report, there is strong evidence that Iran facilitated the transit of al Qaeda members into and out of Afghanistan

before 9/11, and that some of these were future 9/11 hijackers. Iran's support for al Qaeda has continued.

Iran's Opposition to the Arab-Israel Peace Process

Tehran was instrumental in the creation of Lebanese Hizballah, which formed in 1982 under the sponsorship of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), who arrived in Lebanon as the vanguard of Khomeini's Islamic revolution.

Iran continues to provide Hizballah with money, equipment, training locations, and refuge from extradition. Its overall financial support to Hizballah and Hamas totals tens of millions of dollars in direct subsidies each year.

Iranian Designs in Iraq

Demography and geography facilitate the impact of Iran's expansionist ideology. With a population three times Iraq's and a contiguous territory four times Iraq's, Iran exerts a naturally powerful influence on its western neighbor. Iraq's longest border is with Iran (over 900 miles), and the vast majority of the Iraqi population lives within a 100-mile distance from the Iranian border, placing it well within the sphere of Tehran's expansionist ideology.

Shiite pilgrims began flowing once again after 2003 between the holy places in Iran and those in Iraq, especially the holy shrines in Najaf and Karbala. Iranian intelligence agents also flooded the country. They quietly and effectively set up a network of agents across Iraq, recruiting and training local village people, former Iraqi military officers, politicians, and young men to collect intelligence on Coalition forces and facilities.

A long period of secular Ba'athist domination in Iraq punctuated by a savage eight-year war between Iran and Iraq countered Iranian political influence in the region. During this time, westward expansion of Iran's theocratic ideology declined. With the April 2003 collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime and ensuing breakup of existing security and border patrol forces, Iran seized the chance to spread its influence and launched a multifaceted military, intelligence, and political campaign in Iraq.

Along with intelligence agents, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) also sent suicide bombers,

money, and weapons to support insurgents fighting against Coalition forces in Iraq. Testimony and documentary evidence show that officials at the highest level of the Iranian regime have been involved with planning and providing support for terrorists and suicide bombers affiliated not only with the upstart Shiite cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr, but with the forces of wanted Jordanian terrorist and al Qaeda associate, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and Ba'athist loyalists as well.

In late January 2004, an Iraqi terrorist leader captured in Falluja and accused of carrying out beheadings and deadly attacks, claimed that his group was linked to Tehran. In footage aired January 8, 2005 on the U.S.-run television channel, Al-Hurra, Ahmed Yassin, a leader of the Jaish Muhammed (Muhammed's Army) and a former colonel in Saddam Hussein's army, said two members of his group went to Iran in April or May, where they met a number of Iranian intelligence officials and Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei. Iranian officials provided money, weapons, and even "car bombs." During December 2004, the Najaf police chief said that the commander of three terrorists arrested in connection with a car bomb that exploded in the holy city on December 26, had extensive connections to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence.

Tehran also recruited over four thousand volunteers for suicide operations in Iraq in public ceremonies in Iran attended by prominent Revolutionary Guards commanders.

Iranian intelligence services have pumped millions of dollars and hundreds of operatives into Iraq. In a press conference in October 2004, Iraq's national intelligence chief, Mohammed Al Shahwani, accused Iran's Baghdad embassy of recruiting elements for sabotage operations and assassinations of his intelligence agents. He said that documents showed Iran had a \$45-million budget for sowing chaos in Iraq. At least 27 people working in the Iranian embassy in Baghdad were coordinating intelligence-gathering operations and assassinations, the spy chief added.

Iranian meddling is aimed at frustrating the emergence of a stable and representative government in Iraq and also at keeping the United States so occupied in dealing with the insurgency that it would have neither the will nor the resources to pressure Iran on the nuclear issue. In the months and weeks leading up to national elections in January 2005, both Iraqi President Ghazi al-Yawar and Jordan's King Abdullah charged that Iran was heavily involved in attempting to influence the outcome to produce a Shiite-dominated government similar to Iran's. In an interview with the Kuwaiti

daily, *Al-Qabas* on January 6, 2005, Iraqi Defense Minister Hazem Shaalan accused the Iranian regime of “interfering [in Iraq] with money, guns, and intelligence.”

With the apparent success of the Iraqi elections, Iraq has now entered a new phase. Only a day after the January 2005 elections, Iranian media and web sites claimed victory, comparing the Shiites’ gain in the elections with the Iranian revolution that brought an Islamic system to power or with the rise of Hizballah in the Lebanese political scene in the Middle East.

The first and most pressing post-election challenge is to ensure the selection of a representative National Assembly that would draft a modern, broad-minded constitution for Iraq. The aim would be to reflect Iraq’s Islamic soul but avoid a narrow formula for governance based solely on Sharia law. It is to be expected that Iran will seek to influence the members of the National Assembly and their drafting of this constitution.

The makeup of the future interim government is equally important and might succeed to avoid Iranian dominance by seeking as diverse participation as possible from all sectors of Iraqi society. In the transitional period before the constitution comes up for a vote and a permanent government and military and security structure is in place, it will be critical to monitor Iranian efforts to influence the process.

Expansionist Radical Ideology

Iran’s “Velayat e-Faqih” system poses both an immediate and continuing threat to neighbors because of its aggressive policy of expansion. This policy is evident in Iranian actions in Lebanon and Iraq, where calculated cultivation of terrorism is an inseparable characteristic of the theocratic system.

Export of terrorism and extremism is an intrinsic attribute of Iran’s theocratic system. Tehran’s rulers believe their power lies in awakening the Islamic world to their Islamist ideology. Iran’s leadership clearly believes the Islamic Republic’s survival depends on the support of such a global force.

Denial of Basic Human Rights to its own citizens:

The human rights situation in Iran has deteriorated severely over the past year. Ironically, the European Union’s “human rights dialogue” has had the

opposite effect from that intended because the regime has continued its suppression of the Iranian citizenry.

In December 2004, the United Nations in a resolution criticized Iran for public executions, arbitrary sentencing, flogging, stoning, and systematic discrimination against women. The measure also condemned “the execution of minors below eighteen years of age, and the use of torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment.” It also rebuked Iran for discrimination against minorities, including Christians, Jews, Sunnis, and the Baha’is.

Gender discrimination and violence against women in Iran continue to give cause for grave concern. The parliament has called for placing more restrictions on women's attire and on their social freedoms. Deputies have also called for segregating men and women at universities and for other limits on women's activities. The number of publications closed down and of people arrested, prosecuted and sentenced for the peaceful expression of their opinion has increased.

While the human rights situation deteriorated in Iran, the public discontent has been on the rise.

Political Dissent in Iran

Over the past year, hundreds of anti-government demonstrations were held in Iran, further destabilizing the regime. Originating with complaints over municipal issues, a series of anti-regime demonstrations that erupted in 2004 in many provincial cities, such as Feraydoun Kenar, Boukan, and the earthquake-stricken city of Bam, reportedly targeted government buildings, vehicles, and security forces.

In December 2004, students at Tehran University gave President Khatami an angry and humiliating reception when he admitted to the role he played in preserving the regime. They shouted, “Shame, shame” while calling him a liar and demanding his resignation.

The anti-regime movement, partly derailed by the false expectations aroused as a result of the election of Khatami as president in 1997, has now gained a new momentum. The disillusionment of the population with Khatami took place in July 1999, when he failed to support a student demonstration that turned into a six-day popular uprising, spreading to 19 cities and shaking the foundations of the regime. In the midst of a bloody crackdown on the

students, Khatami opted to stand by the establishment; many believe he may have ordered some of the crackdown himself.

The opposition movement meanwhile continued its expansion, and since 1999, many student demonstrations and popular protests have rocked Tehran and other cities.

In Search of a New Approach toward Iran: Options

Some American policy advisors urge the administration to refrain from taking a hard line with Tehran because they interpret recent developments inside Iran as pointing to an impending collapse of the system, much like the Soviet implosion that led to the end of the communist regime in the USSR. Other policymakers advocate engagement with the ruling clerics in Tehran in order to solve controversial issues outstanding between the two countries.

In a difficult atmosphere of diplomatic gridlock, internal and international ideological divisions, and faced with an unappealing slate of military options, the United States needs a broad set of options. This paper outlines a full spectrum of approaches toward Iran, beginning with diplomacy and moving through increasingly more coercive measures, culminating with an outright commitment to regime change.

Diplomacy

Proponents of the diplomatic approach hold that the United States has not offered enough carrots to Iran to address its security concerns. In addition, it is necessary to convince Tehran that it is in its own interests to abandon outlaw behavior, they contend.

There are several carrots that might be offered to the Iranian regime in the hope that a good-faith demonstration by the West to an approach of engagement would elicit desired compliance with international norms of behavior. Most of these incentives have already been placed on the table.

This diplomatic approach requires that Washington cooperate with Europeans to present a united front to the regime. With the example of U.S. resolve in Afghanistan and Iraq before them, the Iranian leadership might be persuaded to reach the appropriate conclusions, if the principal European interlocutors were to emphasize the limits of their ability to influence, much less control, American foreign policy decisions. In a version of “good cop –

bad cop,” the message would be conveyed that there are consequences for noncompliance that are beyond European ability to control.

An effort to acknowledge the legitimacy of Iranian national desires for a civilian nuclear power program might provide Iran an opportunity to demonstrate its peaceful intentions, according to diplomatic approach.

To enhance the acknowledged benefit of exchange programs that bring foreign students and business leaders to the United States for study and travel opportunities, Washington should look for ways to expand such exchange programs, consistent with the requirements of homeland security.

Coercive Diplomacy

A frank evaluation of the track record so far on attempts at diplomatic engagement with the ruling regime in Tehran must conclude that such an approach is not working and probably will not ever succeed, if not stiffened with more stringent measures. Such measures would begin exacting penalties from Iran if it does not comply.

At the top of the list of penalties are economic sanctions, which will not succeed unless applied in concerted and cooperative fashion by all of Iran’s major Western trading partners. Such sanctions would include oil; ban on airline travel; prohibition of financial transaction, bilateral or multilateral economic assistance, and general trade.

Increased funding and strong congressional backing for radio and satellite television broadcasts into Iran would send the message that Washington wants to reach out to the Iranian people. Public statements of support from American officials in favor of imprisoned and exiled Iranian political leaders would be an encouraging sign of support for the people.

The U.S. State Department can send a strong message of disapproval to the regime in Tehran by refusing to issue visas to its United Nations representatives that would permit them to travel beyond the immediate radius surrounding New York City (as occasionally has been done).

In the same vein, the activities of Iran’s diplomatic representation at the regime’s interest section in the Embassy of Pakistan in Washington, as well as at the regime’s UN mission in New York, should continue to be closely observed by the appropriate domestic intelligence and other agencies for

possible unlawful activities that may include espionage, threat, intimidation, or unlawful lobbying with Members of Congress.

Also relevant is a threat of action by an international tribunal for Iranian leadership crimes. It might charge the leaders with support for transnational terrorism and human rights abuses. This threat might be made tangible by bringing a legal case against Supreme Leader Khamenei.

Most important of all, the United States must stay the course in Iraq to ensure that a moderate system takes hold, which is representative, committed to fairness for all Iraqis, and intolerant only of terrorism and violence. Helping the voices of moderate Iraqi Muslims to be heard and protecting them from intimidation by agents of Iranian terror should go a long way to encourage emergence of like-minded moderates within Iran.

As efforts on the diplomatic front are under way, the United States should accelerate its outreach to the Iranian people, as part of the process to help them change their future.

Destabilization

Application of the diplomatic measures may not alter the regime's behavior on those issues of paramount concern to the international community, such as support for terror, pursuit of WMD programs, meddling inside Iraq, and violation of its citizens' human rights. If not, then Washington should be prepared to embrace a new option, short of direct military action, but which might have the best chance for success.

The middle option would open a campaign of destabilization, whose aim would be to weaken the grip of the ruling regime over the Iranian people sufficiently that Iranian opposition groups inside the country and abroad are empowered to change the regime. To the extent that any or all of the foregoing diplomatic measures, coercive or not, are deemed useful, their application should be sustained during a destabilization phase.

However implausible or unlikely to be taken seriously, an American call for Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei and his cohorts "to return to the mosque" might set the stage and be used as a point of departure for further negotiations. Such a call might give the international community a foundation upon which to build a case against the regime.

The next stage of an American-led campaign to compel conformity to international norms of behavior would be to encourage Iranian opposition groups. This is an option that has never actually been on the table and has not been explored sufficiently; this option relies on the Iranian opposition to take the lead role in coordinating a campaign for regime change and establishing representative institutions.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told reporters on her February 2005 European trip, "The Iranian people should be no different from the Palestinians or Iraqis or other peoples around the world." That is, the people of Iran are not immune to the wave of democracy in the Middle East.

In January 2005, six prominent members of the U.S. Congress, led by House International Relations subcommittee chair for Middle East and Central Asia, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), as well as Tom Lantos (D-CA), Eric Cantor (R-VA), Howard Berman (D-CA), Steve Chabot (R-OH), and Gary Ackerman (D-NY), introduced the Iran Freedom Support Act (H.R. 282), with more than 50 co-sponsors. It would provide U.S. assistance to independent broadcasts into Iran and to pro-democracy groups.

The best-known of the Iranian opposition groups is the Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK). Founded in the 1960s by college students, the MEK participated in the 1979 revolution against the Shah, but quickly fell out with Ayatollah Khomeini, who executed thousands of its members and leaders. Following the start of mass executions in June 1981, the group went underground, and many of its leaders fled to France from 1981 to 1986, after which the MEK took refuge in Iraq.

While in Iraq, the group formed an army equipped with tanks, armored personnel carriers, and field guns, implementing cross-border attacks against the Iranian regime. The MEK network in Iran also carried out military operations against the Revolutionary Guards and other government targets. The MEK has represented a significant security threat to the Iranian regime ever since the end of the Iran-Iraq War and could continue to do so, were it released from its circumscribed status in Iraq.

United States policy toward the MEK has been ambivalent and controversial over the years and reached a nadir in 1997, when the Department of State placed the MEK on its Foreign Terrorist Organizations list. This inclusion was primarily a goodwill gesture to Mohammad Khatami, the newly-elected Iranian president, whose administration was looked to with much hope for its reformist promise. Despite the State Department's accusations that the

MEK murdered Americans in mid 1970s and supported the U.S. embassy takeover in Tehran in 1980—charges the organization denies—the MEK has not attacked or targeted U.S. interests since the 1979 Iranian revolution.

Nevertheless, the State Department added the major political wing of the Iranian opposition, NCRI, to the Department's terrorist designation; previously, NCRI had operated in the United States as a legitimate, registered organization.

Before surrendering hundreds of tanks and armored personnel carriers to the U.S. military, the MEK had notable mechanized and infantry capabilities. The fledgling Iraqi Army uses some of this equipment, since 2004.

The MEK seems to have an impressive network in Iran, where it has been gathering intelligence on Iran's nuclear weapons program as well as its activities in Iraq. The MEK published a book detailing the particulars and pictures of nearly 22 thousand people—mostly associated with the MEK—executed for political charges by the Iranian government.

There is sizable support among the exile Iranian community for the MEK, which often draws large crowds to its rallies and demonstrations in western capitals.

The MEK's Relationship with the U.S. Military in Iraq

Months before the start of the 2003 War in Iraq, the United States' major concern was Iraq's eastern neighbor, and its perceived involvement in the conflict that might have complicated the situation in the region. Washington, therefore, offered to alleviate Iran's concerns by bombing and destroying the MEK, hoping to reach an accommodation with Iran in a post-Saddam Iraq.

Days after the start of U.S. bombing of Saddam's forces in late March and early April of 2003, Coalition planes heavily bombed nearly a dozen bases belonging to the MEK, killing dozens of fighters and wounding many more.

U.S. Special Forces worked out a ceasefire agreement with the MEK in April 15, 2003, once the MEK consolidated its forces in a few camps north of Baghdad. The United States decided in May 2003 to disarm the group, and confiscated 2,139 tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery pieces, air defense artillery pieces, and miscellaneous vehicles formerly in the MEK's possession.

In August 2003, in what appeared to be a response to Iranian demands, the State Department acted to close down the offices of MEK associate groups in Washington.

Tehran has been particularly sensitive to the MEK activities inside Iran and abroad, signaling that it takes the dissident group most seriously. European governments and some U.S. administrations have used the MEK as bait to improve relations with Tehran. In a similar vein, the November 2004 European Union nuclear agreement with Iran includes an EU promise to treat the MEK as a terrorist group, which addressed Iran's security concerns.

Although it is difficult if not impossible to gauge the level of support MEK enjoys in Iran, this organization is indisputably the largest and most organized Iranian opposition group. There are nearly 3,800 of its members in Camp Ashraf, 60 miles north of Baghdad. Females constitute nearly a third of its rank and file.

As of February 2005, the State Department still listed the MEK as a foreign terrorist organization, despite calls for its removal from the list by many members of the U.S. Congress and others.

The MEK and other Opposition Groups Support of U.S. Interests

The lack of viable intelligence about Iran continues to plague analysts and planners. As stated earlier, the MEK and NCRI revealed much of the information that has been verified about Tehran's nuclear weapons programs. In this respect, Washington might consider using intelligence made available from opposition groups as lead information, i.e., to be verified using independent means.

A 16-month investigation by the State Department and other government agencies of the MEK members in Iraq culminated in the 2004 judgment that they were "protected persons under the Fourth Geneva Convention," and that there was no basis to charge any of them with terrorist actions.

At this juncture in 2005, therefore, a review of U.S. policy concerning the MEK and the overall Iranian opposition is in order. The designation of the MEK as a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department has served, since 1997, as an assurance to the Iranian regime that the United States has removed the regime change option from the table. Removing the terrorist designation from the MEK could serve as the most tangible signal to the Iranian regime, as well as to the Iranian people, that a new option is now on the table. Removal might also have the effect of supporting President Bush's

assertion that America stands with the people of Iran in their struggle to liberate themselves.

In the same way that the United States was receptive to South African anti-apartheid leaders and the Soviet Union's anti-communist activists, Washington should invite prominent opposition figures both in Iran and in exile to the United States. They might meet with U.S. officials, Members of Congress, academics, think tanks, and the media. The European Parliament offered such an example in December 2004, when it invited Maryam Rajavi, the president of the NCRI to its headquarters in Strasburg, where she offered an alternative view to that of the Iranian regime. Tehran's angry reaction to this invitation served to highlight the effectiveness of such measures.

As an additional step, the United States might encourage the new Iraqi government to extend formal recognition to the MEK, based in Ashraf, as a legitimate political organization. Such recognition would send yet another signal from neighboring Iraq that the noose is tightening around Iran's unelected rulers.

In light of the MEK's status as protected persons under the Fourth Geneva Convention and the continued protection that the U.S. military provides the group in Iraq, Washington has an opportunity to decide whether to return to the MEK its weapons, which would relieve responsibility from the American military for the protection of its camps and personnel. Such a move also would send an unambiguous signal to the Iranian regime that it faces an enabled and determined opposition on its borders.

Iranian groups, whether domestic or internationally-based, which seek to broadcast or publish pro-democracy messages inside the country might be provided with equipment, facilities, funding, and support. Relatively modest expenditures on such purposes can spell the difference between a capability for such groups to get their message out to international publics and in Iran.

The United States should make it official policy to protest publicly cases of human rights violations, crackdown on Iranian student demonstrators, and application of inhumane and degrading punishments, such as stoning to death, flogging, eye gouging, and amputation. Washington should be particularly vigilante in providing political and moral support to student demonstrators in Iran and hold Tehran accountable for the arrest and killing of students during anti-government demonstrations.

Should the United States reach a decision to support an explicit policy of regime change in Iran, a Presidential Finding would be a necessary first step, enabling many activities by U.S. entities that cannot take place without such a finding.

The United States should ensure that Iran understands that neither it nor the Iranian opposition will take any option off the table, if Iran remains unwilling to address adequately international concerns about its nuclear programs in particular. The goal is to ensure that democracy, tolerance, and the rule of law are established in an Iran that abjures use of WMD, terrorism, and threats against its neighbors. Bringing Tehran's flagrant non-compliance with the NPT before the UN Security Council would be an important first step.

In Search of a New Approach: The Military Option

"We do not want American armies marching on Tehran," then-Secretary of State Colin Powell said in November 2004. Despite the official position of the administration, there are some who suggest that given the failure of the engagement option over the past quarter century and the urgency to counter the Iranian threat, Washington should adopt a military option. Despite its risks and implications, they are willing to absorb the costs and consequences. Proponents of strikes believe that United States interests are better served by taking preventive military action in the present than facing the future nightmare of a nuclear Iran with extensive regional dominance armed with the ideology of hate.

Conventional force military options have a broad spectrum upon which to draw, which individually or collectively might evoke different results and/or responses from the Iranian regime.

Air options include low-end, minimal-risk overflights of unmanned aerial vehicles into Iranian airspace for purposes of reconnaissance, psychological impact, testing of Iranian response and capabilities. In addition, maximum options consist of airstrikes by manned aircraft and drones as well as cruise missile attacks against targeted facilities, installations, bases, and command or research centers.

Naval options range from low end overt open waters surveillance and harassment of Iranian shipping to maximum options such as introduction of major forces into theater and a full blockade of Iranian ports and waters.

On one hand, ground forces options include a low-end approach of pressuring Iran through the buildup of conventional ground forces and supporting logistics capability along borders and at strategic locations within the region. On the other hand, there are high-end options, such as a well-planned, fully-coordinated and -executed ground assault into Iran.

On one hand, Special Operations Forces options include low-end clandestine ground operations supported by air insertion/extraction to acquire target information, emplace sensors or precision guidance beacons, or preposition arms/equipment for local insurgents. On the other hand, high-end options consist of direct action missions against pre-selected targets, link-up with indigenous forces to engage and attack government facilities, bases, and personnel. In total context, combinations of the various minimal to maximum options provide a wide array of choices that can exert significant impact on Tehran and influence the regime economically, diplomatically, and politically.

Given the above capabilities, potential military options include:

Limited Actions: Clandestine insertions of Special Operations Forces to acquire precision target information, emplace remote sensors, and preposition arms/equipment. Such actions offer the ability to gather unobtrusively more reliable information than currently available through other military means; these actions also might establish sustainability for future operations. But, such actions do not cause the regime to react as long as such actions remain clandestine and the regime unaware. There is the possibility of extremely negative reaction from various entities internationally and in Iran if such activity were compromised or uncovered.

Moderate Actions: Limited naval blockade that overtly conducts surveillance and harasses Iranian flagged shipping; overt overflights of Iranian airspace by U.S. surveillance aircraft and unmanned platforms; limited buildup of U.S. forces, supplies, and equipment in friendly countries adjacent to Iran; stationing of U.S. Marine amphibious forces off the coast; overt equipping of Iranian dissident groups; limited precision strikes or special operations activities against known WMD targets or munitions factories.

As such measures become increasingly visible to the international public, a negative reaction might occur from many quarters, including, of course, Iran, which would seek diplomatic support in world forums to oppose U.S. activities. Assuming the effectiveness of any actual military strikes that

cause damage to Iran's WMD or other indigenous military capabilities, such offensive measures would degrade Iran's ability to employ/deploy its weapons against United States or other friendly interests.

Outrage from some corners of the globe is to be expected; the possibility of loss or capture of some U.S. service personnel might create a new dimension to the problem; outright military action also might toughen the resolve of the Iranian regime and even turn some of the Iranian people against the attacking forces. Serious consideration must be given to the likelihood that under the extreme stress of being attacked, Iran might unleash Hizballah and other terrorist organizations around the world to launch terrorist attacks against United States and/or other friendly interests. The ultimate potential for pulling the Washington into a full-scale military confrontation with Iran must be weighed before any military action, however limited, is considered.

Maximum actions: Full-scale naval blockade, the landing of U.S. Marine Corps amphibious forces at strategic locations, introduction of airborne, Ranger, Green Beret, or SEAL forces to seize key objectives, and cross-border invasion by land forces. All these actions would be fully supported by preparatory airstrikes intended to disable and destroy command and control centers, anti-aircraft capabilities, as well as key military and logistics centers.

Full-scale military invasion on the scale of Iraq or Afghanistan would be a very serious step, embarked upon with only one ultimate objective in mind: the overthrow of the regime in Tehran and the forcible occupation of the country. In addition to the destruction of regular army, IRGC, and MOIS military units together with their armaments, such an invasion would also number among its objectives the elimination of Iran's WMD programs, and thereby, the ending of WMD threats from Iran.

Full-scale military invasion of Iran, even if supported by an international coalition, would be likely to elicit outrage from many corners of the globe. An invasion would be likely to incur higher casualties and a much longer period of intense, widespread conflict than that experienced in Iraq. Given the size and population of Iran, a full-scale invasion would require a force several times the size of the force in Iraq; continued strain on the overall U.S. military structure and its available resources would affect long-term sustainability of any such operation and the overall ability of U.S. armed forces to respond to crises elsewhere.

Conclusion:

Recall the nuclear time clock that is ticking down as Iran drives to reach nuclear weapons capability. If the regime continues to prove intransigent with respect to fulfilling its obligations under the NPT, the international community may not have the luxury of pursuing only a regime change policy. The theocratic leadership in Tehran must know that they will not be permitted to achieve a nuclear bomb status. A military option, which could include limited strikes against Iran's nuclear program infrastructure, clearly would be a last option but must clearly be understood to remain on the table.

Given the realities in the region and the fact that the United States continues to be engaged in Afghanistan and Iraq, a full-scale military invasion is the least appealing of all the options on the table for dealing with Iran. Nevertheless, as the ultimate means of ensuring U.S. national security interests, such military action must remain unambiguously among the options at U.S. disposal.

The moderate action option that includes limited military strikes would at best buy time while leaving intact or even enhancing the overall threat of the regime in areas like terrorism, opposition to the Arab-Israel peace process, and involvement in Iraq. Nevertheless, limited, precision military strikes, executed according to high quality targeting information with minimal collateral damage and casualties might not only set back Iran's nuclear program to a significant degree but likely would also help destabilize the regime.

In addition, diplomacy pursued by the Europeans and several U.S. administrations has produced little tangible result over the past quarter century. And unless the potential for UN Security Council sanctions is on the table, diplomacy is likely to yield few results in the future.

While keeping open diplomatic and military options, Washington should consider a third alternative, one that provides a central role for the Iranian opposition to facilitate regime change.

Appendix

Iran Policy Committee (IPC) Co-Chair Biographies

James Akins, Ambassador (ret.): James Akins was U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia during the Nixon administration. An internationally respected expert on Middle East and energy issues, Akins has been an active and outspoken proponent for a just resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and a prescient analyst of the Middle East peace process and Arab politics in general. Author Jean-Jacques Servan Schreiber has called Akins “the westerner who knows the most about the Middle East and has the closest relationship of trust with its leaders.”

Lt. Col. Bill Cowan, USMC (ret.), co-founder of wvc3, inc.: Bill Cowan is an internationally acknowledged expert in areas of terrorism, homeland security, intelligence, and military special operations. A retired Marine Corps officer, Cowan spent three-and-a-half years on combat assignments in Vietnam. From 1989 through 1994, Cowan was involved in numerous operations in the Middle East in response to terrorist incidents and the holding of Western hostages in Beirut and Kuwait. He was directly involved in every facet of the Beirut hostages drama, including international negotiations leading to their release in 1991.

In 1990, on behalf of a major New York law firm and working with former CIA Director Bill Colby, he organized and successfully conducted a series of operations resulting in the repatriation of a number of Western hostages from Iraqi-occupied Kuwait. Cowan is a FOX News Channel contributor and a co-founder of the WVC3 Group, a company providing homeland security services, support and technologies to government and commercial clients.

Paul Leventhal, Founder and President, Nuclear Control Institute: Paul Leventhal founded the Nuclear Control Institute (NCI) in 1981 and served as its President for 22 years prior to becoming Senior Advisor and Founding President in June 2002. He prepared four books for the Institute and lectured in a number of countries on nuclear issues, including as Distinguished Visiting Fellow at Cambridge University’s Global Security Programme. Prior to establishing NCI, Leventhal held senior staff positions in the United States Senate on nuclear power and proliferation issues.

Leventhal was Special Counsel to the Senate Government Operations Committee and Staff Director of the Senate Nuclear Regulation Subcommittee; Leventhal was responsible for the investigations and legislation that resulted in enactment of two landmark nuclear laws—the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. He also served as co-director of the Senate Special Investigation of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Accident and Assistant Administrator for Policy and Planning at the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Leventhal holds a bachelor's degree from Franklin and Marshall College and a master's degree from the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism.

Dr. Neil Livingstone, CEO, Global Options, Inc., an international risk management and business solutions company, headquartered in Washington. Livingstone is author of nine books on terrorism and national security topics and more than 200 articles that have appeared in such publications as The Washington Post, The New York Times, and The Wall Street Journal. He serves on numerous corporate and other advisory boards, and has appeared on more than 1100 television programs. He holds an A.B. from the College of William and Mary, three master's degrees, and a Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

R. Bruce McColm, President Institute for Democratic Strategies and Former President, International Republican Institute: McColm is the President of Democratic Strategies, a non-profit organization committed to strengthening democratic processes abroad. For the past 25 years, he has been actively involved in the global movement toward democracy and has written extensively on political transitions in Latin America, Africa, and Central Europe. He has served on numerous boards of directors and acts as a trustee for various private foundations and advocacy groups. McColm served as president of the International Republican Institute, where he extended the organization's capacity to provide technical assistance on economic and political reform around the world, introducing the use of information technologies to democracy programs. Previously, McColm worked in a variety of capacities at Freedom House, a New York-based human rights organization and also was elected a member of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights by the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS). McColm was educated at William College, Harvard University, and the University of Chicago.

Lt. General Thomas McInerney USAF, (Ret.): General McInerney established his own consulting firm, GRTT (Government Reform Through

Technology) in January 2000. Working with high-tech companies that do business with federal, state, city, and local governments, GRRT helps them introduce advanced technology into the private sector. From 1996-1999, Gen. McInerney was Chief Executive Officer and President of Business Executives for National Security (BENS), a national, nonpartisan organization of business and professional leaders, with headquarters in Washington. Prior to joining BENS, Gen. McInerney was Vice President of Command and Control for Loral Defense Systems-Eagan. He joined Loral (then Unisys Electronic Systems Division) in 1994, following 35 years as a pilot, commander, and Joint Force Commander in the United States Air Force. Gen. McInerney retired from military service as Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force and as Director of the Defense Performance Review (DPR), reporting to the Secretary of Defense. In that capacity, he led the Pentagon's "reinventing government" effort, visiting more than 100 leading-edge commercial companies to assimilate their ideas about business re-engineering.

Gen. McInerney earned a Bachelor of Science degree at the U.S. Military Academy in 1959 and a master's degree in international relations from George Washington University in 1972. He completed Armed Forces Staff College in 1970 and the National War College in 1973. Gen. McInerney is a member of several Boards of Directors.

Captain Charles T. "Chuck" Nash, USN (ret.) is the founder and President of Emerging Technologies International, Inc. (ETII). The company's focus is to understand military requirements and then actively search out and identify high leverage, emerging technologies that can be inserted quickly and inexpensively into tools for the U.S. military. Clients include government laboratories and commercial technology companies. Previously, Capt. Nash served as Vice President, Emerging Technologies Group, Santa Barbara Applied Research, Inc. For 25 years before that, Capt. Nash served as an officer in the U.S. Navy, accumulating over 4,300 hours of flight time and 965 carrier landings on nine different aircraft carriers as a Naval Aviator. He served in a variety of command positions with Naval Operations at the Pentagon and U.S. Naval Forces Europe and has filled billets with U.S. and foreign special operations forces in Turkey, Northern Iraq and elsewhere. Capt. Nash previously served on the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and on the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) Expert Panel for the Supersonic Cruise Missile Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration. He was a sponsor and co-chairman of the OPNAV High Speed Strike Information Day, Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory (JHAPL). Currently, he serves on a number of Boards of

Directors and is an advisor to the Chairman of the Board of Isothermal Systems Research, Inc. and to the President and CEO of Vision Technologies International, Inc. Capt. Nash earned his B.S. in Aeronautics from Parks College of Aeronautical Technology, St. Louis University and attended the National War College at Fort L. J. McNair in Washington. Currently a Fox News Channel Military Analyst, Capt. Nash frequently appears on the network to discuss military, terrorism and aviation issues.

Lt. General Edward Rowny, USA (ret.): General Rowny began his military career following graduation from the Johns Hopkins University and the U.S. Military Academy, two Masters degrees from Yale University and a Ph.D. from American University. He fought in WW II, Korea, and Vietnam, commanding units from platoon to Corps size. Later, he served in the 1970s and 1980s as an advisor to the SALT II talks and as the chief negotiator of the START negotiations, with the rank of ambassador. From 1985 to 1990, he was Special Advisor for Arms Control to Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush. In 1989, President Reagan awarded him the Presidential Citizens Medal. The citation reads that Gen. Rowny is “one of the principal architects of America’s policy of peace through strength. As an arms negotiator and as a presidential advisor, he has served mightily, courageously, and nobly in the cause of peace and freedom.” In 1991, Ambassador Rowny retired from government and currently consults on international affairs.

Professor Raymond Tanter, Former Senior Staff Member, National Security Council: Raymond Tanter is Visiting Professor at Georgetown University, where he teaches courses on International Relations and Terrorism. Tanter is adjunct scholar at The Washington Institute for Near east Policy and was scholar-in-residence at the Middle East Institute in Washington. He researched U.S. policy options regarding Iran at both think tanks. After receiving a Ph.D. from Indiana University in 1964, Prof. Tanter taught at Northwestern, Stanford, and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Tanter was a fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford and the Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington and a Fulbright scholar, University of Amsterdam. In 1975, Tanter spent a month as scholar-in-residence at the American Embassy, Tokyo, lecturing on petroleum interruption scenarios, with special reference to the Middle East. In 1967, Tanter was deputy director of behavioral sciences at the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the U.S. Department of Defense and a member of the Civilian Executive Panel, Chief of Naval Operations. He served at the White House on the National Security Council staff, 1981-1982. In 1983-1984, he was personal representative of the Secretary of Defense to arms control talks

in Madrid, Helsinki, Stockholm, and Vienna. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Among Tanter's publications is *Rogue Regimes: Terrorism and Proliferation*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997. Tanter is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Committee on the Present Danger.

Major General Paul E. Valley, USA (Ret.): General Valley retired in 1991 from the U.S. Army as Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army Pacific in Honolulu, Hawaii. Gen. Valley graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and was commissioned in the Army in 1961, serving a distinguished career of 32 years in the Army. He served in many overseas theaters, including Europe and the Pacific Rim countries, as well as two combat tours in Vietnam. He has served on U.S. security assistance missions on civilian-military relations in locales around the world. Gen. Valley is a graduate of the Infantry School, Ranger and Airborne Schools, Jumpmaster School, the Command and General Staff School, The Industrial College of the Armed Forces and the Army War College. His combat service in Vietnam included positions as infantry company commander, intelligence officer, operations officer, military advisor and aide-de-camp. He has over 15 years experience in Special Operations, Psychological and Civil-Military Operations. Gen. Valley was one of the first nominees for Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations under President Reagan and commanded the 351st Civil Affairs Command during the 1980s. He has served as a consultant to the Commanding General of the Special Operations Command as well as the Department of Defense Anti-Drug and Counter-Terrorist Task Forces. Gen. Valley is a military analyst for Fox News Channel and is a guest on many nationally-syndicated radio talk shows. He also is a guest lecturer on the War on Terror and has just co-authored a book entitled *The Endgame, Winning the War on Terror*.

Clare M. Lopez, Executive Director, IPC is a strategic policy and intelligence analyst with a focus on Middle East, homeland security, national defense, and counterterrorism issues. Based for the last five years in the private sector environment of the Washington metro area, Lopez began her career as an operations officer with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), serving domestically and abroad for 20 years in a variety of assignments. Lopez served as a Senior Intelligence Analyst, Subject Matter Expert, and Program Manager for the Alexandria, VA firm, HawkEye Systems, LLC. Lopez previously produced Technical Threat Assessments for U.S. Embassies at the Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, where she worked as a Senior Intelligence Analyst for Chugach Systems Integration. During Lopez's CIA career, she served under diplomatic cover

in various postings around the world, acquiring extensive regional expertise with a career focus on the former Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans. She has served in or visited over two dozen nations worldwide and speaks several languages, including Spanish, Bulgarian, French, German, and Russian. Lopez began a study of Arabic in 2003 at the Department of Agriculture Graduate School before transferring to the Middle East Institute (MEI) in downtown Washington.

Lopez received a B.A. in Communications and French from Notre Dame College of Ohio and an M.A. in International Relations from the Maxwell School of Syracuse University. She completed Marine Corps Officer Candidate School (OCS) in Quantico, Virginia before declining a commission in order to join the CIA. Lopez is a Visiting Researcher and an occasional guest lecturer on counterterrorism, national defense, and international relations at Georgetown University. Lopez is a member of the International Association of Counterterrorism and Security Professionals (IACSP), Women in International Security (WIIS) and the Middle East Institute (MEI).